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ABSTRACT

The Chain-Link Fence Model: A Framework for Creating
Security Procedures

By

Robert F. Houghton,
Utah State University, 2013

Major Professor: Dr. Zsolt Ugray
Department: MIS

A long standing problem in information technology
security is how to help reduce the security footprint. Many
specific proposals exist to address specific problems in
information technology security. Most information
technology solutions need to be repeatable throughout the
course of an information systems lifecycle.
The Chain-Link Fence Model is a new model for creating
and

implementing

information

technology

procedures.

This

model was validated by two different methods: the first
being interviews with experts in the field of information
technology and the second being four distinct case studies

iv

demonstrating

the

creation

and

implementation

of

information technology procedures.
(169 pages)
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PUBLIC ABSTRACT
Information technology security professionals are
facing an ever growing threat to the networks that they
defend. The process for creating procedures to help stem
this threat is very difficult for security professionals.
The Chain-Link Fence Model helps security professionals by
guiding them through the process of creating and
implementing new security procedures.
Robert F. Houghton
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Background
In the early days of management information systems,
network security was not thought of as a necessity because
little threat existed. The only computers were mainframe
computers, so users only had remote terminal access to run
programs. As computers got smaller, dumb terminals were
replaced by microcomputers, which eventually evolved into
personal computers on every single desk. All those
computers were eventually joined together to form the first
intra-office computer networks. By the mid-1980s, the
DARPAnet had evolved from a closed, wide-area computer
network consisting of universities and military
organizations into the internet (ARPANET, 2012), which is a
series of networked computers that are based on open
communication protocols to which anyone can join.
Applications which run on the internet include email, file
transfer protocol, and the World Wide Web. In 1990, CERN
invented the World Wide Web
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_wide_web, para. 3). The
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World Wide Web is an application which uses, at its core,
open standards including hypertext transfer protocol to
display text and graphics. The World Wide Web brought forth
open communication between organizations and people in
general. Customers could place orders directly into a
company’s computer systems, suppliers and vendors could use
shared intranets to keep track of inventory, and library
catalogs could be accessed by academics anywhere in the
world. This openness and free flow of information would
come at a cost, however, as the very system which was the
new “information superhighway” also became an “unpoliced
back alley” (A. Beckett, 2009) for malicious programmers
and hobbyist hackers.
The first major computer security threat was in 1971
(Creeper, 2012). It was the first self-replicating program,
later known as a “virus,” called The Creeper. It displayed
the text, “I am The Creeper. Catch me if you can.”

Because

computers were not as networked together, viruses were
transferred disk-to-disk by what is now known as a
sneakernet: a user would unknowingly take a virus-infected
disk and insert it into a computer, which would then become
infected. Any disk put in an infected computer would become
infected, and an infected disk would infect any computer
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with which it came in contact. In 1988, the Morris Worm
(Morris Worm, 2012) was the first virus to use the internet
to self-replicate and infect multiple computers. It
infected 6,000 computers, which at the time, was ten
percent of all of the computers connected to the internet.
The government estimated the damages to be between $10
million and $100 million. In 1999 the Happy99, Melissa
Worm, ExploreZip, and Sub7 viruses permeated the World Wide
Web and email (Backhouse, Hsu, & Silva, 2006). The viruses
had become so widespread and damaging that it became
painfully obvious to the Information Technology (IT)
community that network security procedures and systems were
needed.
In 1989, the United Kingdom’s Department of Trade and
Industry (DTI) started an IT security awareness campaign
called "keep IT safe" (Backhouse et al, 2006 p. 418). By
1990 this campaign was recognized throughout Europe. The
first European conference on IT security was held in 1992
(Backhouse et al, 2006). The nations of France, Germany,
The United Kingdom, and The Netherlands formed the first
European multi-national security taskforce, called the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD), from which a subgroup was formed, called the
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European Security Forum (Backhouse et al, 2006). “There
were three of us at the [first] meeting [of the European
Security Forum]: the security manager, his director, and
myself. At the end of the meeting, we agreed to bring
together our key contacts who had expressed interest in
security standards in formal and informal meetings. This
decision was a very significant step forward in this
context” (Backhouse et al, 2006 p. 419).
In 1992 the DTI published a report called Security
Breaches Survey (Backhouse et al., 2006), which concluded
that UK businesses were losing £1.1 billion annually
because of computer security breaches. In 1993 the Abraxas
virus, the first major virus that was automatically
generated by virus-generating software, was the spark that
started the standardization process. Seven UK businesses
were involved in drafting the code:

BOC group, British

Telecommunication, Marks and Spencer, Midland Bank,
Nationwide Building Society, Shell International Petroleum,
Shell UK, and Unilever (Backhouse et al., 2006). All
representatives were high-level security managers. The
first draft of what would become industry standard BS7799
was written in only 3 months. It was called “A Code of
Practice for Information Security Management,” (Backhouse
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et al., 2006) and it became an immediate bestseller for the
British Standards Institute. “There was a significant
amount of interest in both DISC and BS7799,” a high-level
security manager interviewed at the time reported. “My
company was an IT consulting company, and after both
publications were released, and in particular after BS7799,
we received a lot of inquiries about BS7799 implementation”
(Backhouse et al., 2006, p. 421). Over 10,000 copies were
sold in September 1993. The transition from a draft into a
ratified standard took place between 1993 and 1995. In 1999
BS7799 was proposed as an International Standards
Organization (ISO) standard. This was changed to ISO
17799:2000 on December 1 2000 (Backhouse et al., 2006).
In 1991, computer security breaches cost U.S.
companies 5.5 billion dollars. By 2006, that number was
projected to have reached $25 billion (Gal-Or & Ghose,
2005). On October 16, 2001, U.S. President George W. Bush
issued executive order 13231, titled “Critical
Infrastructure Protection in the Information Age” (Bush,
2001). This executive order specifically called for the
implementation of “a voluntary public-private partnership,
involving corporate and non-governmental organizations.”
The partnership was tasked with protecting information
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systems infrastructures from disruption or damage. Out of
this initiative came the Computer Emergency Response Team
(CERT). The group was focused on free sharing of computer
security information, and that led disastrously to what
Next Generation Software Services claimed was a “violation
of trust because information was leaked to potential
competitors” (Gal-Or & Ghose, 2005 p. 187). NGSS severed
ties with CERT, providing a glaring example of the failure
of open communication in resolving security issues. Because
of this failure the U.S. market shifted from a governmental
policing system to an internal business security system. As
a result, many American companies began following the
guidelines set forth in ISO17799:2000.
Every U.S. organization, including each university, is
now responsible for its own information security and is
liable for any breaches. According to data collected from
the border firewall flow reports, thousands of Internetbased attacks every second bombard the Utah State
University (USU) campus computing community. The
implication is that a poorly managed computer with basic
security deficiencies can be infected within seconds of
connecting to the campus network. A single infected
computer is a hazard to the rest of the campus. USU is such
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a large, complex environment that demands standardized
computer security policies and procedures. A visual
timeline of the proceeding events is located in the
appendices (see Appendix A). In February 2008, Utah State
University adopted Computer Management Policy 551, which
stated, “All computers connected to the USU Network must be
configured and managed to reduce or eliminate the risk of
loss of control of the computer resource or the stored or
transmitted information.”

The policy mandated university

IT to “develop Computer Management Procedures according to
industry best practices in collaboration with IT advisory
committees and user groups”
(http://it.usu.edu/policies/htm/computer-management-policy,
para. 2).
The policy was a good starting point, but without
accompanying procedures and recommendations, the Chief
Information Officer (CIO) and the USU Central IT Security
Team felt it was only a façade of security. In August 2009,
a task force was organized for the purpose of creating
security procedures which could be enacted to fulfill the
requirements of Computer Management Policy 551. The task
force comprised volunteers from the campus-wide network
managers group. The task force faced a special challenge:
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An endeavor like this could not simultaneously be broad
enough to account for all computing environments and
situations and focused enough to protect the computers most
at risk. The task force also faced the challenge of
acceptance and implementation of its procedures. If the
recommendations were too specific, their application could
be deemed too rigid, regularly irrelevant, and rapidly
obsolete. A small, vocal group of campus IT stakeholders
expressed concern at the university Network Managers
meeting that the official procedures could be used to
override in-the-field expertise. Others expressed concern
that a restrictive policy would equate to restrictions on
academic freedom. On the other hand, if the recommendations
were too vague, their application could be deemed regularly
ineffective, confusing, and even meaningless.
The creation of these procedures took place between
August 2009 and March 2010. The task force (Okelberry &
Houghton, 2010) comprised representatives of three major
colleges, two members of the university central IT
department, and one member from the business and finance
department. This task force met weekly to determine the
scope of systems to be included in the management, the size
of the number of recommendations, and the process of
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determining the specific recommendations. The task force
thought that there were four specific types of computer
systems that composed the bulk of the campus network. They
were computers that used Microsoft Windows operating
systems for high security transactions, specifically users
that handled monetary transactions or student records;
computers that used Apple Mac OS X for high security
transactions; computers that used Microsoft Windows for
routine use; and computers that used Apple Mac OS X for
routine use.
The final draft was presented to the university
management, IT professionals, and the general public at the
March 2010 network managers meeting. The procedures were
approved by majority, voice vote and went into effect March
15, 2010 (Okelberry & Houghton, 2010).
Throughout this process the task force went to great
lengths to ensure that the final recommendations were
accurate, dependable, and most importantly, secure. Users
of university networks were demanding more and more
features to support the myriad of new devices that they
were using to communicate. The task force realized early on
in the process that it needed to limit the scope in order
to accomplish the goal of creating the computer security
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procedures. However in going forward, there would be a need
for further computer security policies and procedures as
always-available communications, on-demand television, and
completely connected devices became the standard use of
computer networks.
As the issue of computer and network security was
ever-changing, there needed to be a streamlined method for
creating policies and procedures without having to start
over from scratch each time. This methodology needed to be
created, documented, and followed to help give uniformity
and accuracy to future procedures.
The Chain-Link Fence Model, created by the author, is
a resulting methodology for creating information security
procedures. It consists of four components: Buy-In, Easeof-Use, Implementation, and Effectiveness. The components
operate in this order:

First, one must create Buy-In needs

before the procedure can be approved. Next, the procedure
is introduced to the users. Ease-of-Use is a major
determinant of whether or not the procedure will be
followed. Computer managers generally handle the software
configuration and training included in Implementation.
Lastly, Effectiveness is measured by an audit system.
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Purpose Statement
The purpose of this research is to create a framework
from which future security policies and procedures can be
created. Additionally, this research seeks to establish how
to encourage universal adoption of and adherence to the
framework, both by designing the framework to be acceptable
to the strong majority of users and by shaping the
organizational culture of an hierarchical organization into
a culture of security. Furthermore, this develops and
refines the Chain-Link Fence Model and assesses how it
increases the quality of the creation, implementation, and
effectiveness of security policies and procedures in a
hierarchical organization.
Conceptual Framework
In the creation of these new security procedures
recommendations, the author relied on the guidance of
theories from the studies of communication and
organizational culture.
The theory of Competing Values Model of Organization
Culture was adapted to fit the task force's goals. This
theory, proposed by Iivari and Huisman (2007), states that
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an organization can be classified into one of four main
cultures:
1. Group culture: change, internal focus. Human

relationships and flexibility
2. Development culture: change, external focus. Future

oriented, considering what might be
3. Rational culture: stability, external focus.

Achievement oriented, focused on productivity
4. Hierarchical culture: stability, internal focus.

Security, order, routing, following regulations
(Iivari & Huisman, 2007, p. 37)
When presented with these points during its meetings, the
task force members agreed that Utah State University fit
within the Hierarchical culture classification. In
accordance with the organizational culture model, the task
force concluded that they would need to achieve a level of
Buy-In among information systems (IS) administrators from
all units around the institution in order to accomplish its
goal of creating a system of security for Utah State
University. The theory helped shape the focus of the task
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force and its goals by giving specific methods to present
the proposed security procedures.
Several themes emerged from the review of the task
force meeting notes. These themes were interwoven into a
model to help define information systems security as a
whole for hierarchical institutions. These themes became
components of the Chain-Link Fence Model of Information
Systems Security. This study analyzes and validates the
Chain-Link Fence Model of Information System Security
Policy and Procedure Creation.
Original Contribution
The contribution to the general IS knowledge base of
this research is the development, validation, and analysis
of the Chain-Link Fence Model of creating Information
System Security Procedures. After reviewing relevant
literature to date, no other comprehensive framework has
been established to observe this procedure in a large
organizational setting.
Layout of the Dissertation
The first section is a review of literature explaining
the history and current state of information technology
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security as well as a look into the creation of policy,
procedures, or industry standards. Next is the presentation
of the Chain-Link Fence Model, the full description, and
its development. The third section is the establishment of
the methods and procedures followed by the researcher. This
includes the timeline of events and the study design
consisting of two parts: 1) deep interviews with three
members of the university information technology department
and 2) the case study interviews with four lab managers.
The following section outlines the development of the
Chain-Link Fence Model. This includes the history of
security at Utah State University, creation of security
procedures, the need for replication, the formulation of
components, and how it links to prior research.
This study next reports the specifics of the deep
interviews. In part one of the study, three subjects
discussed their experience with components of the ChainLink Fence Model and how it helped develop the new USU
security procedures. Part two presents the validation of
the model as a whole. Four start-to-finish case studies
validate the entire model. Finally the study concludes with
the summary of findings, a discussion of any weakness of
the study, and a call for further research.
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REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Many studies have been conducted on a wide range of
topics to help information security professionals obtain
their goals of mitigating security threats in their own
organizations. In order to help future security
professionals, it is important to see the current state of
research into information technology security. This
literature review looks into research in the field of
information technology security.
The objectives for this literature review are:
1. to explore the evolution of information technology
security;
2. to discuss the research into the creation of policy,
procedures, or industry standards, the results of
that research, and their effect on information
technology security; and
3. to discuss conclusions drawn by previous research.
Review Procedures
In order to sort the broad array of topics found in
the search, the papers were coded using a system developed
to help identify the type and conclusion of the study.
Based upon the coding system, the papers were included in
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or discarded from this review. The papers included in this
review all have characteristics that relate to the creation
of security policy and procedure.
Locating the Papers
Papers were located using a search of JSTORE, Business
Source Premier, and Google Scholar. Ninety-eight papers
were identified that are relevant for this research via
this search. The author’s discussion with his major
professor led to another recent paper. From this paper two
other references were obtained.
The keywords for the Internet searches are as follows:
Management information security, security policy, security
policy creation, security procedures, security procedures
creation, information technology security, technology
security management, Internet security policy, Internet
security procedures, network security, management network
security, network security policy creation. The papers
included in this review needed to meet the following
criteria:
1. they needed to be referenced by a scholarly source
or
2. they needed to be referenced by two other papers
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that met the first criteria.
This process identified 95 papers for reference in this
review.
The History and Current State of Information Technology
Security
Mustonen-Ollila and Lyytinen (2003) studied IS process
innovation from 1940 through 1997. Their paper gave a brief
history of information technology. It addressed the issues
that faced information technology professionals including
the beginnings of information security. Due to the nature
of the research, a case study methodology was used. They
identified four generations: Gen 1 (1940-1960) dealt mostly
with hardware constraints, Gen 2 (1960-1980) dealt with
software constraints, Gen 3 (1980-1990) dealt with user
relationships and Gen 4 (1990-present) dealt with
organizational constraints. “The most important items in
these factors observed to influence adoptions were: user
need recognition, technological infrastructure, past
technological experience, own trials, autonomous work, ease
of use, learning by doing and standards” (Mustonen-Ollila
and Lyytinen, 2003, p. 293).
Overall, IS process innovations are expected to
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improve the quality and productivity of IS
development where the products – ISs – are
defined as systems of hardware and software
capable of digital information storage,
processing and communication that can serve some
organizational functions or purposes. (MustonenOllila and Lyytinen, 2003, p. 276)

One of the largest constraints in developing security
process was discussed by Kotulic and Clark (2004). They
conducted a survey to determine whether their proposed
security model would have any success. “Information
security research is one of the most intrusive types of
organization research, and there is undoubtedly a general
mistrust of any ‘outsider’ attempting to gain data about
the actions of the security practitioner community”
(Kotulic and Clark, 2004, p. 604). The response rate to the
questionnaire was 5.1%, which was statistically not enough
to conduct an analysis. They surmised that the scope was
too large and the population too diverse.
Historically, threats and vulnerabilities have
not been considered until after a security breach
had occurred. The goal of risk management is to
maximize possible gain while minimizing possible
loss. The risk management process must be a costeffective, nontechnology driven, value creation
process that contributes to the overall
effectiveness of the organization. (Kotulic and
Clark, 2004, p. 598)

They also concluded that because of the secrecy nature of
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IT, security companies were reluctant to share data.
Firms are unwilling to divulge such information
without strong assurances that the information
provided will in no way harm them, yet could
provide insight in how to improve their
organization. Time is far better spent focusing
on a few, select firms with whom the researcher
has developed an excellent rapport and trust.
(Kotulic and Clark, 2004, p. 605)

They recommended further studies to advance the study of IT
security.
While actual security breaches are rarely reported,
spyware (software written for the purpose of gaining
information about their target) attacks have been widely
reported and analyzed by researchers. Warkentin, Luo, and
Templeton (2005) were among the first to discuss the rising
threat of spyware to government and the resulting incentive
for lawmakers to create anti-spyware laws.
Many spyware components use the veiled approach
of placing the intention to monitor notification
within End User License Agreements (EULAs)
immediately before the installation of other
programs. But because users commonly accept the
EULAs without being aware they are installing
software that will monitor their activities,
there may be consent without awareness, certainly
not true informed consent. (Warkentin, Luo, and
Templeton, 2005, p. 80)
They comment that legislators do not fully understand the
problem. “Confusion over spyware has caused many companies
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to refrain from adequately implementing spyware solutions.
Spyware is not understood as well as other security threats
(such as P2P, viruses, worms, and hacking)” (Warkentin, Luo,
and Templeton, 2005, p. 84). In conclusion, they ask, “Why
are the distinctions between positive and negative
consequences important? If legislators enact laws without
clear specification, unintended outcomes could ensue”
(Warkentin, Luo, and Templeton, 2005, p. 83).
Most current businesses do not realize the potential
for network security breaches. Herath and Rao (2009) stated,
“We, however, found that the certainty of security breaches
does not have a significant impact on the security concern”
(Herath and Rao, 2009, p. 117). Along those lines, LaRose,
Rifon, and Enbody (2008) stated that “four-fifths of all
home computers lack one or more core protections against
virus, hacker, and spyware threats” (LaRose, Rifon, and
Enbody, 2008, p. 71).
Sriramachandramurthy, Balasubramanian, and Hopis (2009)
used a survey to determine how users protect themselves
from spyware and adware.
Spyware refers to applications that include
adware which may be installed without an enduser's consent, with the goal of tracking and
collecting personal information without
consent ... [We] define adware as computer-
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resident software applications that serve pop-up
windows with advertisements that are not related
to, or authorized by, the Web sites an individual
chooses to visit. (Sriramachandramurthy,
Balasubramanian, and Hopis, 2009, p. 42)
They found that there are two main components to security:
technical (firewalls, security software suites) and riskavoidance (not going to questionable websites, not using
p2p software.) They hypothesized that users with a greater
technical knowledge, greater security awareness, higher
experience, and greater confidence in their own skills were
more likely to use defensive measures to protect themselves
and their computers. They found their hypotheses to be
statistically valid.
Vroom and von Solms (2004) detailed how IT auditing
was currently working, namely auditing the validation of
data. The authors stated that from IT auditing grew a
subset called IS security auditing, which audits the
policies and procedures of the organization and not just
the technology. “As organizations have expanded globally,
auditing the financial transactions only is no longer
enough” (Vroom and von Solms, 2004, p. 192). The authors
further stated that human factors were not being addressed.
For example, if an unauthorized employee attempts
to access information, the audit logs will record
this. Unfortunately, it may go undetected until
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the auditor reviews the documentation. The
results of the employee’s behavior and actions
have been detected and audited, but not the
behavior itself ... According to the 2001
Information Security Industry Survey, of all the
security breaches perpetrated by the employees of
the organization, 48% of them were accidental.
This demonstrates that not all security breaches
are maliciously intended, but may be the result
of negligence or ignorance of the security
policies of the organization. Of the remaining
security breaches, 17% was intentionally
committed, and of the other 35%, it was [sic]
unsure whether it was malicious or not.” (Vroom
and von Solms, 2004, p. 193)

The authors suggested that by changing the culture of the
organization, security could be enhanced. “A utopian
information security culture would be where the employees
of the organization follow the guidelines of the
organization voluntarily as part of their second nature”
(Vroom and von Solms, 2004, p. 195).
Gal-Or & Ghose (2005) stated, “IT executives revealed
that they were more concerned with the ripple effects of
online security breaches on consumer confidence and trust
in e-business than the actual financial losses of physical
infrastructure” (Gal-Or & Ghose, 2005, p. 197).
Dinev and Qing (2007) reported that:
computer viruses, spyware, cyber attacks, and
computer system security breaches are daily
occurrences. In the ten year period from 19932003, the number of security incidents reported
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to CERT increased from 1,334/year to 137,529/year.
In order to effectively manage and control the
ever-evolving and growing security threats, it is
obviously not enough just to rely on deployment
of security technologies such as anti-virus and
intrusion detection software and hardware. (Dinev
and Qing, 2007, p. 387)
At the beginning of the recession of 2009, Hoffman
(2009) interviewed security analysts about whether or not
the recession would cause any changes to information
security. All the analysts interviewed recommended to
purchase security software. Brian Fuher, a program manager
of SoftwareOne stated, “’[The reason to install antimalware]
is the same reason we're probably buying insurance on our
cars. The cost of damage is so great ... It's low-risk,
high-reward. It's low-cost and such a great devastation if
you get successfully attacked’”(Hoffman, 2009, p. 2). Sean
Stenovitch, a partner with M&S Technologies, is quoted,
“’In a down economy, desperation is going to create even
more of a security risk.’" He concluded, "’[What] it really
boils down to [is that] customers have to have security.
They have to have protection’” (Hoffman, 2009, p. 1).
Tittle (2005) introduced the concept of a Managed
Security Services Provider (MSSP). These MSSPs are useful
for small to medium size organizations that cannot employ
an internal IT security team. An MSSP is an outsourced
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security company that conducts both security evaluations
(audits) as well as active monitoring for other
organizations. “An MSSP is a third party that works with
clients to assess and define security needs, evaluates any
security policies, practices and procedures in place, and
then implements and maintains a security infrastructure on
its clients’ behalf” (Tittle, 2005, p. 20).
Manning (2010) refers to using Software as a Service
(SaaS) to help mitigate and outsource IS security. The
article details how SaaS systems can integrate and fulfill
government regulations. “Preservation of principal and
value is another headline risk management concern for
treasurers” (Manning (2010), p. 2). “Technology has
provided a solution via bureau-based ‘soft-ware as a
service’ (SaaS) options that allow companies to outsource
their SWIFT messaging processing to a third-party for a
service charge plus transaction costs, avoiding the need to
manage the necessary infrastructure in-house” (Manning,
2010, p. 1).
The Institute of Management and Administration (IOMA)
(2002) details fully automated security systems. The author
predicts that by 2015 robot security guards will start to
become economical compared to their human equivalents. This
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futuristic technology is already one of the primary tools
used by the military for combat surveillance. “While the
U.S. military has for years used robot patrols to monitor
warehouses and other indoor environments, they are
investing significant resources to improve the technology
so they can conduct outdoor patrols of airport grounds,
military compounds, and fuel storage facilities” (IOMA,
2002, p. 6).
Herath and Herath (2009) stated that in 2007, 74% of
organizations reporting attacks confirmed that the source
of the attack was a virus or other malicious code. “Given
the importance of computer and information security,
investment in information security is now recognized as a
critical issue by both practitioners and academics alike
(Herath and Herath, 2009, p. 338).” “Information security
projects have high-risk characteristics due to the changing
threats to IT systems and the uncertainty associated with
potential breaches” (Herath and Herath, 2009, p. 343). They
concluded the following:
If the first security investment is undertaken,
the manager can undertake the second information
security investment ... at any time between years
1 and 3. If both the first and second information
security investments are undertaken, the manager
can invest in a third platform information
security investment ... anytime between years 3
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and 5. (Herath and Herath, 2009, p. 359)
The Security Director's Report of IOMA in August of
2009 summarized new data about technology-based security
systems. The report found that, despite prevailing beliefs
about these systems, technology alone does not prevent IS
crime.
In fact, property owners are so confident that
these new, high-end systems will deter crime, few
of them make an effort to validate the
effectiveness of the systems they’ve implemented—
perhaps, because no one wants to find out they
just spent a lot of money for nothing. (IOMA,
2009, p. 1)
“The fact that researchers could find no proof of the
systems’ [sic] ability to cut crime should give security
executives a moment’s pause” (IOMA, 2009, p. 13). They
concluded, “We found no persuasive evidence that the
introduction of CCTV [closed circuit television] and
ancillary electronic monitoring equipment to [the subject
complex] in Manhattan reduced the incidence of crime in
[it]” (IOMA, 2009, p. 15).
Though not prosecutable in criminal court, use of
spyware is harmful, and attempts have been made to
prosecute it in civil court. Oser (2004) discussed court
proceedings against Claria Corp and WhenU.com. The article
stated how the defendants produced spyware and provided ad
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services across the internet. As of 2004, they were on the
verge of having an initial public offering (IPO).
Claria Corp. and WhenU.com, the two largest
companies that produce the free, downloadable
software called "ad ware," are increasing their
profits year after year. Claria, the Redwood City,
Calif., leader, which filed to go public in April,
had $90.5 million in revenue in 2003 and is
expected to enjoy a 30% expansion in revenue in
2004. Claria's main competitor, WhenU, is
profitable and on its way to $50 million in gross
revenue in 2004, according to CEO Avi Naider.
(Oser, 2004, para. 3)

“Top advertisers across the pop-up space, as compiled by
Nielsen/NetRatingsAdRelevance, range from bottom feeders
such as LowerMyBills to blue-chip brands such as American
Express” (Oser, 2004, para. 5).
The Process of the Creation of Policy, Procedures, or
Industry Standards and their Effects
on Information Technology Security
Organizations combat the aforementioned threats by
creating security policies and procedures. The first
procedures focused on the technology. As the threats
changed, the policies and procedures shifted from
technology-based to human-based solutions. Adams and Sasse
(1999) first studied password schemes. The authors used a
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web based questionnaire to study password systems. The
questionnaire focused mainly on password related user
behaviors (password construction, frequency of use,
password recall, and work practices). They found that most
users did not think that their job was high enough to
warrant any effect on a breach of their account. They also
found that users did not understand the authentication
process, and that most confused the username with the
password, thus trying to make their username as complex as
their password and forcing further confusion. “Constantly
changing passwords” were blamed by another employee for
producing “...very simple choices that are easy to guess,
or break, within seconds of using ‘Cracker’ Hence there is
no security” (Adams and Sasse, 1999, p. 42). A cracker is a
type of software program used to break passwords, either
through brute force or by analytical attack. “Since
security mechanisms are designed, implemented, applied, and
breached by people, human factors should be considered in
their design. It seems that currently, hackers pay more
attention to the human link in the security chain than
security designers do, for example, by using social
engineering techniques to obtain passwords” (Adams and
Sasse, 1999, p. 41)”
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Sasse, Brostoff, and Weirich (2001) did not want to
lay the blame solely on users. They argued that users
should not be blamed for being the “weakest link” in the
information security process. They stated that environment
and lack of training were larger issues that need to be
addressed. “Security has largely ignored usability issues;
many users of security systems face unattainable or
conflicting demands, and receive no support or training”
(Sasse, Brostoff, and Weirich, 2001, p. 123).
BT security staff believed that the rising number
of password resets was due to a small number of
careless ‘repeat offenders’ — by their own
definition, employees who ask for a reset 6 or
more times a month. Study 2 found that 91.7% of
resets were caused by ‘normal users’, i.e. more
than 90% of users cannot cope with the password
mechanism in the way they were expected to, which
is a rather damning result in terms of usability
of password mechanisms. (Sasse, Brostoff, and
Weirich, 2001, p. 125)
“Consequently, security must be designed as an integral
part of the system that supports a particular work activity
in order to be effective and efficient” (Sasse, Brostoff,
and Weirich, 2001, p. 128).
Spears and Barki (2010) stated:
It is widely believed that organizational efforts
to manage IS security are typically focused on
vulnerabilities in technological assets such as
hardware, software, and networking, at the
expense of managing other sources of
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vulnerabilities, such as people, policies,
processes, and culture. (Spears and Barki, 2010,
p. 503)
“Users are likely to be more attentive when IS security is
something to which they can relate” (Spears and Barki, 2010,
p. 518).
Users can also allow themselves to become the gateway
to security breaches. Bose and Leung (2007) found that five
percent of people responded to phishing emails. A phish is
when a hacker uses directed and customized message to
entice a user to give private information. They stated:
“Being a part of the global community, both corporations
and individuals have certain social responsibilities to
fight phishing” (Spears and Barki, 2010, p. 566).
Gillespie (2009) reported that, while CIOs realize
that security is one of the high agenda items on their
lists, they do not fund security studies, reports, or
audits. “They must attract key stakeholders to Buy-In to
security from the off, in order that any corporate security
policies generated are received from the whole company”
(Gillespie, 2009, para. 9). “Security, information
management, and information risk management should stop
being seen as a costly add-on and in some cases a 'perk’.”
“Instead, they need to be seen as fundamental core business
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requirements.” (Gillespie, 2009, para. 3)
Cremonini and Nizovtsev (2006) focused on analyzing
the behavior of the attacker to gain an understanding of
how to concentrate on network security. “Viewing attackers
as rational agents is consistent with several theoretical
and empirical studies” (Cremonini and Nizovtsev, 2006, p.
1). “Any given security measure affects the frequency of
intrusions through two mechanisms ... one is the increased
ability of a target to withstand attacks of a given
intensity. The other effect ... occurs through a change in
attackers’ perception of the target in question” (Cremonini
and Nizovtsev, 2006, p. 2). “The main purpose of investing
in security is to defend against malicious attackers”
(Cremonini and Nizovtsev, 2006, p. 4). “Our analysis
suggests that the magnitude of the behavioral effect can
greatly exceed that of the direct one” (Cremonini and
Nizovtsev, 2006, pp. 21-22).
Rees, Bandyopadhay, and Spafford (2003) proposed a
framework for creating short-term security policies. They
focused upon the fact that information technology changes
rapidly and that security polices, when created, will
outlive their useful life-cycle. Their model focuses upon
constant feedback. After every ideation of the development
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they consult their stakeholders for feedback. “Because
policy development is an iterative process, the model
includes feedback loops at every step” (Rees, Bandyopadhay,
and Spafford, 2003, p. 102). They found that if one builds
short-term policies “the security infrastructure” is more
likely to be built on time and to meet requirements (Rees,
Bandyopadhay, and Spafford, 2003, p. 102). This results in
a Buy-In from their stakeholders as well as the ability to
revisit the policy. “A security policy that is not
constantly evaluated and updated is of no value” (Rees,
Bandyopadhay, and Spafford, 2003, p. 105).
GoodHue and Straub (1991) studied user behavior
concerning security models. The authors identified four
issues:
1. as risk increases, users negative perceptions of
security measures decrease;
2. as more resources are used to increase security
awareness perceptions of satisfaction with security
increases;
3. users who are more computer savvy will have lower
levels of satisfaction with current security; and
4. risk and company action is affected by user
awareness.
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“Although I/S [sic] managers have at least marginal
concerns about security, non I/S [sic] managers seem to be
less concerned” (GoodHue and Straub, 1991, p. 118). They
argued that “insufficient computer and data security is a
major problem in many organizations, [sic] and that low
levels of concern contribute to the danger” (GoodHue and
Straub, 1991, p. 124).
Weirch and Sasse (2002) interviewed users to find how
they responded to security threats and password policies at
their institutions. The authors found that most of the
users did not have enough insight into security threats to
use good judgment in challenging password policies. “Users
cannot be forced to behave in a proper fashion, but an
effort to persuade them to do so has to be made” (Weirch
and Sasse, 2002, p. 143). “In addition, many users are not
sufficiently educated about security issues. Thus, many
users construct their own, often wildly inaccurate models
of security threats and the importance and effective
deployment of security measures” (Weirch and Sasse, 2002, p.
137).
Anderson and Agarwal (2010) took a unique view into
the direct realm of the home user. They focused on home
users because: “In late 2005, a watershed event occurred in
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the worldwide penetration of information and communication
technology: the number of computer users with Internet
access crossed the one billion mark” (Anderson and Agarwal,
2010, p. 614). They conducted a study of local internet
service providers (ISP) users, and when they did not
receive enough replies for a proper representation, added
undergraduate students at a large university as a sample.
They concluded that “the factors influencing home computer
users’ attitude toward security-related behavior include
concern about security threats, self-efficacy, and
perceived citizen effectiveness that, in turn, influence
security behavior. Security behavior is also influenced by
psychological ownership and subjective and descriptive
norms” (Anderson and Agarwal, 2010, p. 630).
Workman, Bommer, and Straub (2008) conducted a study
to gauge how much people thought about security threats and
how well they coped with them. The authors found that when
people had a higher perception of security threats, they
took more precautions, and when they had a higher level of
coping, they again took more threats seriously. “Coping
depends on whether people feel that their ability to take
security actions have been reasonable (self-efficacy),
providing that they perceived that the threat is
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preventable in the first place (locus of control)” (Workman,
Bommer, and Straub, 2008, p. 2802). However, they found
that “fear appeals can be counter-productive. When there
are excessive false-positive alarms, people will tend to
discount fear appeals” (Workman, Bommer, and Straub, 2008,
p. 2812).
Herath and Rao (2009) proposed a framework for
security deterrence. They modeled this framework upon
criminology general deterrence theory, theory of planned
behavior, and procession motivation theory. The authors
conducted a survey of 312 respondents representing 78
organizations. The framework focused upon changing
attitudes about security perceptions throughout the
organization because “although organizations actively use
security technologies and practices, information security
cannot be achieved through technological tools alone”
(Herath and Rao, 2009, p. 106). They found that “Most
organizations spend time and resources to provide,
establish, and monitor computer security policies; however,
if the end-users of organizational IS are not keen or
willing to follow the policies, then these efforts are in
vain” (Herath and Rao, (2009, p. 118). “We, however, found
that the certainty of security breaches does not have a
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significant impact on the security concern ... More
importantly, it is necessary for IT management to
communicate the reality of security threats to
organizational end-users” (Herath and Rao, 2009, p. 117).
Grossklags, Christin, and Chuang (2008) used game
theory from economics to explain hacker behavior and
possible solutions. Game theory is the study of how people
make strategic decisions.
Economics as a tool for security analysis has
gained in importance since the economy of
attackers has become ... motivated by greed over
the last years. This [is] in contrast to that
exhibited by the hacker communities of the 1980s
and 1990s, who valued reputation, intellectual
achievement, and even entertainment above
financial incentives. (Grossklags, Christin, and
Chuang, 2008, p. 3)
The authors identified two key components of a security
strategy: “self- protection (e.g., patching system
vulnerabilities) and self-insurance (e.g., having good
backups)” (Grossklags, Christin, and Chuang, 2008, p. 4).
The authors continued, “we model security as a hybrid
between public and private goods” (Grossklags, Christin,
and Chuang, 2008, p. 6). The computation of the protection
level will often take the form of a public goods
contribution function. Because network protection is a
public good, it may allow, for certain types of
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contribution functions, individuals to free-ride on others’
efforts. “Agents have two security actions at their
disposal. They can contribute to a network-side protection
pool or invest in a private good to limit losses”
(Grossklags, Christin, and Chuang, 2008, p. 33). At the
same time, some individuals may also suffer from inadequate
protection efforts by other members if those have a
decisive impact on the overall protection level.
One of the most forceful industrial standards is that
of the health care industry. Bresz (2004) discussed
security frameworks in the context of the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA). The
article explains how to implement new security training
programs that are compliant with HIPAA. The four main
points of HIPAA in regard to IS security are security
reminders, protection from malicious software, log-in
monitoring, and password management.
If you do not plan to start a “reasonable and
appropriate” security awareness and training
program fairly soon, then your people will
continue to be your weakest link in information
security, and your organization may be at risk of
not being in compliance with the HIPAA Security
Rule as of April 21, 2005. (Bresz, 2004, p. 57)
“While a technology can be used to guard against malicious
software and can aid in the detection and reporting aspects,
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it is ultimately a personal responsibility to be aware of
software anomalies and to report them” (Bresz, 2004, p. 58).
“Sound security needs to be something your organization’s
personnel ‘live and breathe’ everyday. It must become an
integral part of the company culture, with management
sending the right message” (Bresz, 2004, p. 60).
Another major industry pursuing information technology
security standards is the payment card industry (PCI).
According to Kim (2011), standards such as HIPAA and PCI
are the primary motivation for organizations to adopt
security innovations. PCI compliance has been in the
forefront for security experts due to the fact that most
businesses-to-customer transactions utilize either a debit
or credit card. Vijayan (2008) interviewed Hannaford, a New
England grocer, about their upgrading to a PCI-compliant
network. He questioned whether or not it is enough just to
have new systems, or if there are other factors.
Despite the lack of more stringent requirements,
encrypting card numbers on point-of-sale devices
is "the most significant action" that retailers
can take to stop attacks such as the one that hit
Hannaford, said Gartner Inc. analyst Avivah Litan.
But that doesn't necessarily mean that the new
security measures will make Hannaford — or other
companies that follow its lead — immune to future
attacks. (Vijayan, 2008, p. 14)
He concluded: “The unanswered question, though, is whether
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that will put up a wall strong enough to keep future
attackers out” (Vijayan, 2008, p. 14).
Beckett (2005) discussed the concept of information
security in the field of music. This was a new concept that
producers faced. The producers found that they needed to
secure their events for the masses that use the wireless
spectrum to conduct the business of concerts.
“Wireless networks are increasingly deployed at
[concerts], as they are ideal for locations that
lack existing infrastructure. But these too
demand the highest levels of security," said
Simons, a producer with Mean Fiddler. Because of
the increasing threat, they disable all floppy
and CD drives both for festival and permanent
office use. All devices handed out to staff are
anti-virused and pre-configured. "There's no
chance of anyone being able to load any untoward
software," Simons said. All devices are "ringed"
and loaded with standard software. (Beckett, 2005,
para. 15)
Scholz (2009) discussed how even security
professionals make the basic mistakes. The author focused
on scope as one of the main problems that professionals
face. “Information system boundaries can be confusing and
are seldom identified fully” (Scholz, 2009, p. 35). He
concluded, “No matter how you are structured, you must have
management buy in or you have nothing!” (Scholz, 2009, p.
33).
Burke (2006) detailed shoppers’ concerns when
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purchasing goods from a website. The author reviewed
information gathered by Hewlett Packard (HP) about load
times and Consumer Reports about privacy policies. He
discussed third-party logos, such as Verified by Visa or
Protected by McAfee, and how those logos increased consumer
confidence in the websites on which they appeared.
“Encouraging consumers to trust your Website involves
committing time and resources to communicate the safety of
your site, the professionalism of your operation, and the
credibility of your brand” (Burke, 2006, p. 42).
Yeh and Chang (2007) proposed a four-factor framework
for creating measurable IS security. They surveyed 1000
Taiwanese IT professionals across 4 major industries:
general manufacturing, high-tech, banking, and retail. The
results showed that across the board, IS networks had the
greatest threat severity in all categories. “Often the
benefits of security are not considered important until a
security breach has occurred” (Yeh and Chang, 2007, p. 489).
“This study also considered the scope of countermeasure
adoption; it did not appear to be commensurate with the
severity of the perceived IS threats” (Yeh and Chang, 2007,
p. 482). They found that “security adoption tends to be a
need-pull innovation rather than technology-push. As a
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result, organizations probably only adopt new
countermeasures when their security methods appear insecure”
(Yeh and Chang, 2007, p. 490). Their conclusion stated,
“[Service based industries] should emphasize their security
policy development and allocate security accountability”
(Yeh and Chang, 2007, p. 491).
Von Solms and von Solms’ paper (2004) discussed the
“10 sins of information security.” These sins were created
from the authors’ perspective as security officers for the
central bank of South Africa. The sins were simply
presented and not researched. They were:
1. not realizing that information security is a
corporate governance responsibility (the buck stops
right at the top);
2. not realizing that information security is a
business issue and not a technical one;
3. not realizing the fact that information security
governance is a multi-dimensional discipline
(information security governance is a complex issue,
and there is no silver bullet or single “off the
shelf” solution);
4. not realizing that an information security plan
must be based on identified risks;
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5. not realizing (and leveraging) the important role
of international best practices for information
security management;
6. not realizing that a corporate information security
policy is absolutely essential;
7. not realizing that information security compliance,
enforcement, and monitoring are absolutely
essential;
8. not realizing that a proper information security
governance structure (organization) is absolutely
essential;
9. not realizing the core importance of information
security awareness amongst users; and
10. not empowering information security managers with
the infrastructure, tools, and supporting
mechanisms to properly perform their
responsibilities.
Da Veiga and Eloff (2007) proposed a framework for
information security governance. They focused their
framework on developing a security culture. “To inculcate
an acceptable level of information security culture, the
organization must govern information security effectively
by implementing all the required information security
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components.” (Da Veiga and Eloff, 2007, p. 361)
As time went by, the “technical people” in
organizations started to realize that management
played a significant role in information security
and that top management needed to become involved
in it too (Von Solms, 2000). This led to a second
phase, where information security was
incorporated into organizational structures. (Da
Veiga and Eloff, 2007, p. 362)
They also stated, “Security policies, procedures, standards,
and guidelines are key to the implementation of information
security in order to provide management with direction and
support (ISO 17799, 2005) and they should clearly state
what is expected of employees” (Da Veiga and Eloff, 2007, p.
369).
Stanton, Stam, Mastrangelo, and Jolton (2004) analyzed
end-user behavior. They surveyed 1,167 people in the U.S.
about their use of passwords and how they responded to
password policies. “Appropriate and constructive behavior
by end users, system administrators, and others can enhance
the effectiveness of information security while
inappropriate and destructive behaviors can substantially
inhibit its effectiveness” (Stanton, Stam, Mastrangelo, and
Jolton, 2004, p. 2). “First, our survey suggested that end
users have a rather dismal record of enacting the basic
hygiene behaviors that security experts suggest are
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important in maintaining the safety of user accounts (e.g.,
frequent changes to one’s password)” (Stanton, Stam,
Mastrangelo, and Jolton, 2004, p. 8). “Through careful
analysis of end user security-related behaviors,
organizations can help to ensure that workers have the
motivation and knowledge to follow the policies that the
organization sets to promote its security agenda” (Stanton,
Stam, Mastrangelo, and Jolton, 2004, p. 9).
Furnell, Dowland, Illingworth, and Reynolds (2000)
surveyed users about authentication behavior. They
discussed a lack of user understanding of authentication
and stated that authentication was easily compromised. They
discussed a replacement of authentication systems: “If the
password approach is to be replaced or supplemented, then
alternative means of authentication are clearly required.
However, when considering such alternatives, a number of
factors can be cited that may complicate their adoption:
•Effectiveness (i.e. the ability to detect impostors,
whilst allowing legitimate access).
•Cost (i.e. financial overheads of deployment).
•User acceptance (i.e. the friendliness and
transparency of the measure).” (Furnell, Dowland,
Illingworth, and Reynolds, 2000, p. 529)
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They concluded that “overall, a significant factor in the
acceptance of alternatives to the password will be that of
education. If people can be shown that newer authentication
techniques are safe, reliable and secure, then their
acceptance is likely to be improved” (Furnell, Dowland,
Illingworth, and Reynolds, 2000, p. 538).
Charndra and Calderor (2005) proposed using biometrics
as an enhanced security measure to positively identify
users in high security areas. They predicted that
biometrics will become more standardized as time goes on.
The authors proposed six categories that stand in the way
of full implementation: Technical, Legal, People (Trust and
confidence), Business (Cost and control), Operation (Lab vs.
real world), and Systems (integration with existing
security measures). “The very connectivity that enhances
global business increases vulnerability and exposure
associated with attacks on computer systems” (Charndra and
Calderor, 2005, p. 102). “Protection of information
resources must involve a process that unambiguously
identifies and authenticates users” (Charndra and Calderor,
2005, p. 102).
Cryptography is one method of ensuring that network
communication stays private. Stix (2005) said, “The
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challenge modern cryptographers face is for sender and
receiver to share a key while ensuring that no one has
filched a copy” (Stix, 2005, p. 1). Based on his study,
network managers face a difficult task in ensuring that the
appropriate key is sent to the correct people without
publishing it across the Internet. “The current uses for
quantum cryptography are in networks of limited geographic
reach” (Stix, 2005, p. 3).
Backhouse, Hsu, and Silva (2006) showed how power is
part of the standardization process. They studied the work
of Stewart Clegg, who related power to a circuit. "The
episodic circuit emphasized actions and changes in the
organizational context. It manifests when an A makes a B do
something the latter would otherwise not do” (Backhouse,
Hsu, and Silva, 2006, p. 415). Just as electricity flows
through an electrical grid, power also flows between social
relations, working practices, and techniques of discipline.
Changes in power come from external forces like
regulations, mimetic forces, or changes in industry. These
changes in power cause people to go through obligatory
passage points (OPPs). OPPs are exactly what A wants B to
do (e.g., if B wants access to a document, A requires him
to use a username and password). The authors used a case
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study to conduct their research. They studied a British
company transitioning from the standard BS7799 to ISO 17799.
The term of the study was September 2003 to March 2004. The
primary source of data was from interviews via telephone,
via email, and in person, in that order. The interviews
used validation criteria defined by Klein and Myers (1999).
The authors’ findings suggested that the standard became an
OPP when business B required A to adhere to the standard
when dealing with business B. This again shows the external
forces required when an OPP is in place.
The Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development's (OECD's) Guidelines for the Security of
Information Systems and Networks suggested four tasks that
management needed to perform: 1) state the policy, 2)
direct action plans, 3) review results, and 4) take
corrective action.
They further outlined nine principles that provide a
comprehensive framework for information security: 1)
awareness, 2) responsibility, 3) response, 4) ethics, 5)
democracy, 6) risk assessment, 7) security design and
implementation, 8) security management, and 9) reassessment.
1. Awareness: Participants should be aware of the need
for security of information systems and networks
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and of what they can do to enhance security
2. Responsibility: Everybody is responsible for
security
3. Response: Everybody should act quickly and
courteously to prevent, detect, and respond to
security incidents
4. Ethics: Everybody should respect the legitimate
interests of others
5. Democracy: The security of information systems
should be compatible with the values of a
democratic society
6. Risk assessment: Each aspect of operations is
reviewed.
7. Security Design and Implementation: Follow the
system development life cycle (SDLC) established by
the company
8. Security management: Ensure that proper people are
employed to follow both extremely scripted actions
as well as outside-the-box thinking
9. Reassessment: Always follow up with auditing. (OECD,
2002, Section III, para. 2)
Cavusoglu and Raghunathan (2004) proposed that
traditional decision theory-based approaches to security
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create a dichotomy to the false-positive or false-negative
rate of security systems (as one decreases, the other
increases). They proposed using game theory as the basis of
designing a security system due to the fact that outside
threats use human intervention and not just an uncertain
response.
Although the decision theory–based approach can
provide a useful starting point for managing risk
in settings where potential for fraud exists, we
argue in this paper that this method is
incomplete because of the problem’s strategic
nature ... Hackers do not randomly select their
targets. They rationally make their choices based
on how much effort will be required to succeed in
hacking, the probability of getting caught, and
the possible penalty. (Cavusoglu and Raghunathan,
2004, p. 132)
Cavusoglu, Raghunathan, and Yue (2008) also used Game
Theory to predict investment in IT security. They found
that using game theory had a higher payoff than using
decision theory approaches except when hacker activity
levels were precisely estimated.
The reason for the limitation of traditional
models, when applied to analyze IT security
problems, can be stated as one simple proposition:
They do not allow a firm’s security investment to
influence the behavior of hackers. On the
contrary, behavioral influences of security
technology on hackers have long been recognized
by researchers and practitioners in the security
community. (Cavusoglu, Raghunathan, and Yue, 2008,
p. 283)
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Straub and Welke (1998) discussed risk, specifically
loss based upon systems risk. This risk can be managed when
managers are keenly aware of the full range of risk and the
most effective controls to that risk. “The key to [managing
risk is] successfully deterring, preventing, and detecting
abuse as well as pursuing remedies and/or punishing
offenders for abuse” (Straub and Welke, 1998, p. 445).
Davis (1989) proposed the Technology Acceptance Model
(TAM). TAM dealt with how users responded to new technology.
Davis found that users adapted new technology if it was
easy (ease-of-use) and useful (help in their jobs).
Fang, Chan, Brzezinski, and Xu (2006) used the
Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) to explain wireless
technology acceptance. They categorized the tasks performed
on wireless handheld devices into three categories: (1)
general tasks that do not involve transactions and gaming,
(2) gaming tasks, and (3) transactional tasks. They found
that use of wireless handheld devices was increasing in all
of these categories. Especially as these devices were used
for electronic commerce, personal and financial information
became more vulnerable. One of their conclusions was that
“The future of electronic commerce depends on controlling
information security threats, enhancing consumer security
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perceptions, and building trust” (Fang, Chan, Brzezinski,
and Xu, 2006, p. 129).
Rotchanakitumnuai and Speece (2009) used TAM in the
context of internet securities trading. They examined the
antecedents of perceived usefulness and explored the role
of trust and attitude of securities investors toward usage.
The behavioral intention of investors to use the internet
securities trading service was influenced by perceived
usefulness, attitude toward usage, and trust. “In addition,
trust is important at all levels of the TAM”
(Rotchanakitumnuai and Speece, 2009, p. 1069).
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DESCRIPTION OF THE CHAIN-LINK FENCE MODEL
Establishment
The Chain-Link Fence Model of security procedure
creation was derived from the need to establish a
streamlined method of creating security procedures at Utah
State University. Based on a review of current literature,
some studies discussed a need for more security. Other
papers proposed better security through various methods,
such as increasing user trust of IT professionals,
proposing specific technologies, and creating management
Buy-In. None of the studies detailed how an organization
should go about creating security procedures. The
contribution of this study to the general IS knowledge base
will be the development, validation, and analysis of the
Chain-Link Fence Model for the creation of Information
System Security Procedures. According to the preliminary
research conducted, no other comprehensive framework was
found to guide the development of the procedures in a large
organizational setting.
The goals of the Chain-Link Fence Model are:
1. to provide a model from which anyone can create
procedures that have the best possible chance of
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accomplishing the security goals of the
organization;
2. to identify how to create procedures that are in
harmony with the goals of the organization;
3. to assist in creation of procedures that can be
understood by all levels of the organization; and
4. to outline a method for efficiently creating
procedures without the need to convene a group of
representatives from the organization.
From these points the interdependent components of the
Chain-Link Fence Model: Buy-In, Implementation, Ease-of-use,
and Effectiveness, were derived (see Figure 1).
Each of these components addresses issues that were
highlighted in notes from the task force meetings or found
in previous research.
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Figure 1. The Chain-Link Fence Model.

Buy-In is the process of selling the new policy or
procedure to all users of the organization. Management
needs to buy-in to the procedure so that it will be
implemented. Users need to buy-in to the procedure because
they will be the people who choose whether or not to follow
it on a daily basis. Without this user Buy-In, they will
find ways to circumvent the procedure without raising
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suspicion. This affects both the Effectiveness and Ease-ofUse domains.
Implementation is the process by which computer
managers configure software, use security tools, or teach
their users how to follow the new procedure. The success of
Implementation is directly related to Ease-of-Use. A
procedure that has the support of the management and users
will still fail if the proper steps are not taken to
implement it.
Ease-of-Use mitigates costs associated with training
and lack of compliance with new procedures. It also lessens
the need for an in-depth knowledge of security tools. Users
who are burdened by the new procedures may rebel against
them. If the new procedure is easy to follow, users are
more likely to use it. If Ease-of-Use is not included in
procedure, both Buy-In and Implementation are ineffective.
Effectiveness is an assessment of how the security
procedure reduces the threat it addresses. Effectiveness is
the hardest component to predict because it can only be
measured after the procedure is implemented. If the
procedures do not change the threat impact, then there was
no point gained in creating procedures in the first place,
thereby wasting time, effort, and resources. These points
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are the basis for the Chain-Link Fence Model

The Chain-Link Fence Model
Graphically, each component of the Chain-Link Fence
Model links to create a fence of security for the
organization. If one of the components is missing, the
fence will have a gap through which security threats can
enter the organization.
The components of the Chain-Link Fence Model usually
operate in sequence:

Buy-in must be created to entice

stakeholders to invest time, effort, and resources in
developing procedures. Next, the procedure is introduced to
all the necessary users, thus implementing the procedures.
Computer managers generally handle the software
configuration and training included in Implementation.
After Implementation, Ease-of-Use is a major factor in
whether or not the procedure will be followed by the users.
Lastly, Effectiveness is measured by an audit system.
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RESEARCH METHODS AND PROCEDURES
Timeline of Events in the Research
The task force for creating computer security
management at Utah State University was created in August
2009 (see Appendix A). One of the first processes that the
task force set out to accomplish was to define the scope
for new computer management procedures. It was decided that
the scope should be narrow to help focus the task force to
complete the procedures without having to become experts in
every future technology issue. Because of the narrow scope,
the author realized that newer and broader security
procedures would need to be created to help manage security
threats as technology changed. This realization implied
that the entire process would be repeated as security
threats changed. By creating a process for creating
security procedures, future resources may be saved.
One of the tasks the task force assigned to its
members was to find out how peer institutions responded to
security threats and if they had any procedures that could
be implemented at USU. Most institutions’ security
procedures were too narrow to use or were nonexistent. This
led to a study of industry standards and academic research
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into both procedures as well as the processes for creation
of security procedures. This research helped form the
components and structure of the Chain-Link Fence Model.
The Chain-Link Fence Model was created as a framework
to help standardize the process of creating security
procedures. As co-chair of the task force, the author used
the Chain-Link Fence Model to create the computer
management procedures. The Network Managers Group, a group
composed of computer professionals from the colleges,
departments, and labs at USU, approved the computer
management procedures in February of 2010.
The interviews as outlined in the study design were
conducted in two groups. Subjects A, B, and C were
interviewed in April 2010 with follow up interviews in
February 2011. Data collection from the Nessus results
started in September 2009 and continued until the end of
May 2010. Subjects D, E, F, and G were asked to use the
Chain-Link Fence Model framework to create security
policies in July of 2011, and final interviews were in late
September and early October 2011.
Study Design
The first portion of the research was model
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development. The model was developed based upon theory,
observation, and expert insight. After the creation of the
model, seven subjects were interviewed, and these
interviews were divided into two main parts. The primary
methodology of the interview portion was the case study
model. In Part One, the Validation of the components of the
Chain-Link Fence Model, the first case study gathered data
through interviews, observation notes, and statistical
reports to validate the components of the Chain-Link Fence
Model by analyzing the adoption of new security procedures
at Utah State University. In Part Two, the Validation of
the Chain-Link Fence Model, four computer lab managers
tested the Chain-Link Fence Model by using it to create new
procedures for their labs. The resulting data was gathered
through further interviews. For both main parts, the
subjects were given the opportunity to review the
transcription of the interview and to clarify any comments.
The case study technique provided in-depth study of a
single event, in the case of Part One, the adoption of new
security procedures at Utah State University. A case study
also allowed for the testing of the model proposed as
outlined in Part Two with the four additional subjects.
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Details of the Study
This paper is divided into two parts. Part One refines
and establishes the validity of the Chain-Link Fence Model;
Part Two tests its actual implementation.
Part One: the validation process for each component of the
Chain-Link Fence Model:
This is an assessment of the Chain-Link Fence Model
using interviews with upper IT management personnel
regarding the success of the new security procedures at USU.
Their responses validated each of the four components of
the Chain-Link Fence Model.
Additionally, a statistical analysis of computer
security data from before and after the implementation of
the new security procedures was conducted. Because the new
procedures contained the components of the Chain-Link Fence
Model, the statistical data was used to determine
correlation between the Chain-Link Fence Model and IT
security threats.
Part Two: The study of the model from start to finish:
Four computer lab managers at USU were presented with
the Chain-Link Fence Model along with an explanation of its
components. They were then asked to use the model to create
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security procedures for their labs. After they implemented
the procedures, follow-up interviews gauged their perceived
results.
The Process of Interviewing the Subjects
In order to refine and validate the Chain-Link Fence
Model, information technology professionals were
interviewed. The interviews were held over the course of
two years and were divided into two groups. The first,
presented as Part One, consisted of three information
technology professionals from the university information
technology department. The other four subjects, as
presented in Part Two, were lab managers from different
colleges or departments from across the university. These
seven subjects came from all levels of the organization
from the CIO to small lab managers. The subjects had all
been in the information technology field for more than
seven years, were currently managers of either departments
or computer labs, and had been with the organization for
more than five years.
Criteria for Selection of Case Study Subjects
The primary criteria for selection of subjects was
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that they did not participate in the task force. This was
necessary to help validate the Buy-In category, as members
of the task force would have a bias toward accepting the
computer management procedures.
Second, the subjects needed to be managers of
departments or computer labs. This insured that they had
perspective on the Implementation component. They would
need to either teach their subordinates how to implement
the new procedures or do it themselves. This consistency of
implementation was extremely important in the computer lab
environment because each lab would have dozens, potentially
hundreds, of users on a given system.
Third, subjects needed to have experience in computer
management. This gave them insight into Ease-of-Use. By
having years of experience, they knew what users needed and
how users interacted with the computer system. They were
able to evaluate the difficulties of different procedures,
including their own.
Fourth, the subjects needed to be actively involved in
computer management. In order to see if a procedure was
effective, they needed to have access to log files, audit
reports, and Nessus penetration results. They then needed
to interpret the reports to see if security procedures were
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having any effect on their labs.
All seven subjects were specifically selected for each
of the above categories and agreed to participate in the
study without any expectation of gain. Each also agreed to
participate in multiple interviews over a 2-year span. Each
subject was recommended by another member of the
university’s Network Managers group for their handling of
computer management. Together, the subjects managed or were
part of the group that managed over 90% of the computer
labs across the campus. Each subject was given a letter
designation (A through G) to ensure anonymity.
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THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CHAIN-LINK FENCE MODEL
History
As co-chair the task force beginning August 2009, the
author determined that there must be a framework for
achieving the goal of developing IT security procedures on
the USU campus. After researching many different
institutions for their security procedures and finding that
most did not have any formal written procedures available,
the research literature guided the development of this
model.
The available literature showed no single standard for
creating security policy or procedures. There were helpful
guidelines provided by the National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) that contained references to computer
security, the International Information Systems Security
Certification Consortium, Inc., (ISC)² maintained a global
standard for information technology security professionals,
and Microsoft offered a class on how to properly configure
Windows in various environments.
These resources, however, did not contain any method
of a higher level framework to create security procedures.
They had either very specific guidelines for a subset of
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requirements (e.g., Microsoft’s configuration for small
business and (ISC)² model for penetration testing), or in
contrast, they were overly broad (like NIST’s statement of
security management and assurance). In part, NIST stated,
“Ultimately, responsibility for the success of an
organization lies with its senior management. They
establish the organization's computer security program and
its overall program goals” (NIST, 2012). The author then
started searching the academic research topics for
guidelines, frameworks, procedures, and other keywords to
help develop a framework so that the efforts of the task
force could be replicated quicker and easier.
The Creation of the Procedures
The university employed many individuals who had
information technology responsibilities. All had varying
degrees of knowledge of information technology. The task
force realized early on that this potential knowledge base
needed to be used to help guide the formation of the
computer management procedures. The task force decided to
create a survey to help identify and prioritize the
procedures.
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The task force created a survey in September 2009 to
determine how different departments handled computer setup,
maintenance, and replacement. It was hosted on
surveymonkey.com and given by invitation to all IT
professionals at the university. This survey was conducted
through November 15, 2009 and had 44 respondents. The
survey contained a list of security tasks. Each respondent
was required to categorize each task by required,
suggested, or optional. The raw data was then coded by a
scoring system of five points for required, three points
for suggested, and one point for optional. Each task was
then averaged for the total mean score of that procedure.
Tasks that scored above four points were initially placed
in Tier 1 (Required). Tasks that scored between three
points and four points were initially placed in Tier 2
(Suggested), and, tasks that scored below three points were
initially placed in Tier 3 (Optional) (see Table 1).
These tasks constituted the computer management
procedures for Windows, standard security. Results for
other systems can be seen in Appendix B.
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Table 1
Task Force Survey Results

Tier 1 (REQUIRED)

Rating
Average

Install/configure anti-virus software

4.95

Configure automatic Windows updates

4.80

Register IP address in OpenIPAM

4.55

Install/configure firewall software

4.37

Update drivers

4.27

Disable the local Windows Guest account

4.12

Disable auto-run

3.39

Tier 2 (SUGGESTED)
Employ secure user password policies (complexity, length, expiration)

3.94

Convert file system to NTFS

3.91

Uninstall "bloatware"

3.79

Install/configure anti-malware software

3.79

Install/configure SCCM

3.29

Reformat hard drive and install Windows from scratch

3.11

Configure least necessary privileges for the computer owner's account

3.05

Configure automatic third-party software updates, when available (e.g., Adobe Updater)

3.05

Disable all unnecessary services (e.g., utilize Windows Baseline Security Analyzer)

2.94

Rename local Administrator account

2.52

Disable Administrator account

1.85

Tier 3 (OPTIONAL)
Employ a backup solution (e.g., shadow copy, store-to-network, portable external drive)

2.94

Configure services to use non-default ports (e.g., Remote Desktop)

2.88

Employ security-related group policies via Active Directory (i.e., join Windows domain)

2.82

Install/disallow certain web browsers

2.82

Install security protections specific to installed web browser(s) (e.g., FireFox No Script plug-in)

2.69

Configure power management options

2.68

Employ security-related local group policies

2.60

Install/configure third-party software update notifiers (e.g., Secunia Personal Software Inspector)

2.52

Install Windows from an actively maintained image (e.g., Ghost)

2.50

Install Windows from scratch with slipstreamed service packs and/or patches

2.41

Rename the local Windows Guest account

2.41

Remove local administrator privileges from computer owner's user account

2.40

Configure browser to automatically purge browsing history

2.20

Encrypt the hard drive

1.33
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After compiling the results from the survey, the task
force used them with subsequent internal discussion to
create the finalized version of the computer management
procedures. After conducting the survey, the university was
given an outside security audit that found some of the
procedures should be categorized higher to prevent a
greater threat than others. The task force took into
account these recommendations and created the final version
of the computer management procedures.
The notes from the task force meetings show the
following observations:
1. Each person on the task force was more concerned
about his own departmental needs than the security
needs of the organization as a whole. One member
did not want any other members of the university IT
community to have any type of access on his system.
As a result, the person did not want to join any
centralized administrative process, specifically
the university’s global Windows domain.
2. The members of the task force did not all have an
awareness of, or experience using, the security
tools that the organization had at its disposal.
One member did not know any of the benefits of
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using organizational units (OU) within Windows
Group Policy. Once this concept was explained, he
realized that he could accomplish more security
goals with less effort when he was working as part
of the group.
3. Each person in the task force wanted the
organization to have a more secure network and was
willing to help produce that result. One member
postponed his vacation for six months to be able to
provide his input.
4. There was a need for the task force to establish
the scope of the procedures, specifically what
devices and software would be included or excluded.
The procedures that were created only covered
Macintosh and Windows-based PCs. While the procedures were
a guideline on how students should set up their computers,
the procedures fell under the University employee policy,
and there was no requirement that students use the
procedures.
The Need for a Framework
Information Technology is an ever-evolving field, and
the process of creating procedures needed to be repeated
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time and time again to address new devices and technologies
that arise. As USU grew, the largest growth area in the
network was wireless connections. As the internet had
increasingly become people’s main source of media, the
number of devices that took advantage of this new method of
distribution grown. New devices, including the Apple iPad,
Motorola Droid, and Google Chromebooks, made it harder to
define what an IT device was. Most people would agree that
anything computer-related would come under the IT umbrella,
like laptops, desktops, networking devices, etc. However,
devices like game consoles, blue-ray players, and
televisions had wireless internet connectivity built-in.
As more of these devices joined the network, new
procedures were needed to define secure methods of using
these devices. It took eight people six months of weekly
meetings to create the current procedures in this study.
Institutions cannot afford to dedicate numerous resources
every time they need a new security procedure. If there was
a model to follow for creating security procedures, then
anyone who saw a security need could use it and quickly get
procedures implemented. Using this experience on the task
force as a guide, the author developed the Chain-Link Fence
Model for the creation of security procedures.
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Formulation of the Components
A major paper influencing the author’s development of
the Chain-Link Fence Model was by Da Veiga and Eloff (2007).
Their paper had a framework for IS governance, rather than
security directly. Their framework suggested changes to the
organization’s security culture. It discussed the need for
management buy-in to change the culture.
Buy-in
Backhouse et al. (2006) addressed power. Without full
buy-in from those in power, the process could not be
completed. This and the Da Veiga and Elorff (2007) article
showed how the process starts with buy-in. In their study
of spyware Warkentin, Xin, and Templeton (2005) found that
understanding the problem, or buy-in, would help in the use
of anti-spyware software. Gillespie (2009) stated that buyin was necessary for enhanced security.
Ease-of-Use
An influence of the Ease-of-Use component is a
standard of IS research in the Technology Acceptance Model
(TAM) by Davis (1989). His research into TAM suggested that
ease-of-use helped users develop the necessary skills to
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adopt new technology. In the current study, the author
predicted that with new security procedures, there would be
new-to-users technology that they would need to accept.
Mustonen-Ollila and Lyytien’s study of IS history (2003)
also showed that one of the most influential factors in
progressing IS process was ease-of-use. In 2009, Scholz
discussed basic mistakes that were caused by overly
confusing the security process. This confusion suggested
that ease-of-use must be part of the process in order to
prevent human error.
Implementation
At this point, the model’s framework showed a logic
gap. To go from organizational buy-in to ease-of-use, users
needed the actual procedures to be written with full
documentation. Bresz (2004) researched how hospital
information technology dealt with Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA). One of the key
parts of HIPAA was full documentation before changes could
be made to a system (i.e., a procedure for implementation).
Von Solms and von Solms’s (2004) article of the 10
sins of IS security suggested that training both the
culture and users were very important to maintaining proper
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security. Vroom and von Sols (2004) stated that up to 48
percent of breaches were accidental in nature. This showed
that proper implementation of procedures could greatly
reduce security issues. This led to the inclusion of
implementation as a component of the Chain-Link Fence Model.
Sasse et al. (2001) showed that users needed training to
avoid being the weakest link in the security process.
Effectiveness
The buy-in component was necessary for development,
and the ease-of-use component was necessary for users to
change the overall culture of security. Rees et al. (2003)
created short-term security policies. The usefulness of
these policies was determined by feedback from stakeholders.
This led to the inclusion of evaluation as part of the
Chain-Link Fence Model framework. Vroom and von Solms (2004)
showed how auditing was an effective tool for gauging how
an organization complied with their security policies.
Furnell et al. (2000) specifically discussed how
effectiveness could also lead to adoption of security
measures, showing how the starting point of a future model
could be at the end of a process.
As the components were identified, the model of the
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framework needed to be expounded upon. The first diagram
for the model of the framework was a straight line (see
Figure 2).
The straight line, however, implied that once the
process was complete, the goal was achieved. As the Rees et
al. (2003) article stated, there needed to be a constant
feedback part to the model, in essence closing the loop.

Buy-in

Implementation

Ease-of-use

Effectiveness

Figure 2. Developmental Step 1 of Chain-Link Fence Model.

This led to a different model demonstrating an evercompleting cycle required by constant feedback (see Figure
3).
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Buy-in

Effectiveness

Implementation

Ease-of-use
Figure 3. Developmental Step 2 of Chain-Link Fence Model.

Further thought led to the realization that each
component was not a stand-alone component. They needed
interaction to build upon each other. Also, while the cycle
did start with Buy-in, the linear model could only run
forward in sequence.
This led to back the final completed framework and the
name for the Chain-Link Fence Model.
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VALIDATION OF THE COMPONENTS OF THE CHAIN-LINK FENCE MODEL
PART 1: DEEP INTERVIEW AND EFFECTIVENESS MEASURE
Introduction
The need to replicate the process of creating security
procedures drove the need to create a repeatable model. In
order to ascertain whether or not the proposed model worked,
experts needed to validate the proposed model. This created
a need to interview experts in information technology
security.
The Interview Process
The questions for the interviews were composed based
upon a review of the literature in the field. The questions
were also written specifically to avoid using the names of
the components of the Chain-Link Fence Model in order to
draw out responses that would not have bias toward
expounding the model. Finally, while the same questions
were asked of all subjects, the questions were open-ended,
and each subject was free to elaborate on topics important
to him regarding computer security. These digressions also
helped provide data that reflected on the overall model.
Each interview was scheduled before a significant
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break, either lunch, mid-day, afternoon, or before end-ofbusiness to allow for as limitless a time period as
possible. Each interview was held at the subject’s primary
work environment. In addition to placing the subjects in an
area with which they were familiar and in which they were
accustomed to thinking about security matters, this had the
added benefit of placing them near their work resources so
that they were able to answer questions on the spot,
without having to research the question and report back
later.
Each interview was recorded on analog tape, forcing a
human interpretation of the transcriptions. After
transcripts of the interviews were made, each subject was
allowed to look at the transcript of his interview to judge
whether the transcript was accurate. Because there were no
digital copies of the recordings, it was much easier to
prevent duplication and to help keep the interview subject
anonymous.
Questions asked of the first subjects interviewed were
asked of subsequent subjects as deemed relevant. Questions
which were confusing in early interviews were clarified for
later subjects. The full list of interview questions can be
found in Appendix C.
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Reception of the Security Procedures
Everyone at the organization knew that the status quo
was not a good security plan. At the January 2010 meeting
outlining the new procedures, the Network Managers Group
discussed the ramifications of establishing organizational
procedures. Notes from the meeting included the following
exchange:
Attendee 1: Does this apply to everybody?
Bob: Everybody connected to the network.
Attendee 2: What happens if we don't follow [the
procedures]?
Bob: You risk having your computer compromised by a
hacker, and if you develop a problem, you could find
yourself on the disabled list.
At the meeting there were a few who felt that the
procedures were draconian, but after the group went over
the specifics of the procedures, it was established that
the procedures consisted of activities that most were
already doing.
The procedures were adopted at the following meeting
February 9, 2010. They were ratified by the entire Network
Managers Group at the monthly meeting. After allowances for
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questions and an in-depth discussion of the procedures, the
vote to establish them was unanimous.
Buy-in
Interview subjects were asked about their thoughts on
the procedures to establish the presence of Buy-In. All
subjects thought highly of the newly-adopted computer
management procedures.
Subject A, the CIO, had long wanted to build a
procedure that could be used to get everybody “on the same
page.”

He recognized that consensus, or Buy-In, was key to

an effective security procedure. He stated, “The first
strength is [that] it’s ... documented and it’s achieving
consensus.” When discussing the security implications, he
said, “In regards to security, it’s certainly better than
anything we had. One of the goals of this above beyond
anything was to get ... some consensus.” He continued, “The
ability to come to consensus [and have the] Network
Managers group say that this [is a] thing we should be
doing [is key]. The compliance of the individual items
[exceeded] my expectations. I wasn’t entirely sure if we
could come to any consensus on this, but that happened. And
that, for me, overshadows any weaknesses.”
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Subject B also seemed to have a strong opinion of the
importance of Buy-In. He said, “I think it was a big
task ... to bring consensus from a large group of people
across campus, and so I think it was [a] great effort.”
When asked what he thought was one of the most important
points of the recommendation, he immediately responded,
“Buy-In from the community, because I felt that that was
the only way to do it.”
Subject B: Central IT couldn’t come up with those ...
we aren’t our service desk guys working with desktops
on a day-to-day basis ... The only way we could get
what’s going on out there was to get people who were
doing this on a day-to-day basis. And that had to go
way beyond IT. So Buy-In was part of it, and the other
part was to get a broad picture of input.
Subject B provided important insight, as he was involved in
approving the procedures.
Subject B: We have some folks, who can sometimes be
critical ... They always wanted to challenge something,
and I hoped they would take the opportunity to get
aboard.
In regard to the process, Subject B thought that using
the task force to create the procedures was one of the
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contributing factors to Buy-In. He stated, “The committee
that made it happen, just made it happen, and there we got
an excellent product, excellent product ... I couldn’t
[have] been happier.”

When asked what specifically made

the committee work so well, he said, “what was cool [was
that] we had folks representing several of our largest
colleges: [the] College of Business, [the] College of HASS,
which is our largest college on campus, [the] College of
Agriculture which is big, [and] Person X [with the] College
of Education. So we had four of the [eight] major colleges
represented.”
At the conclusion of the interview, Subject B
commented:
“I watched you present this last time, [and] you got Buy-In
from the larger group, saying, ‘here are some core areas of
must-haves and here is some recommended practices ... and
here are some things to think about.’ I was hoping only for
the PC stuff. I figured if we [got] to the PC, [then] we
[could] put another group together that would take that PC
stuff and then interpret it for the Mac. The fact that you
came out with Mac’s stuff was just a bonus. The fact that
you came up with the idea of ‘Well, we’ve also got to
address this for computers who are dealing with sensitive
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information ...’ you know, to come up with that was just
another bonus. Originally, I was just hoping for that first
list.”
Subject C felt that the research done in support of
the procedures led to his total approval of the product.
Bob: So, based upon what you read on the final report,
how well do you think that the task force evaluated the
validity of all the opinions presented to them?
Subject C: Well, I thought that part was actually
excellent. You guys brought a strong statistical sense
of propriety to the project. I think you did an
excellent job of sampling and representing how deep you
felt about it.
His next response underscores how difficult it usually was
to obtain Buy-In across different branches of a large
organization.
Bob:

Did the final conclusions match your

expectations?
Subject C:

I thought they were better than I

expected ... I expected you guys to come out of there
with broken arms, broken legs ... and one or two of
you with a slit throat and some fairly non-specific
recommendations. We were very pleased with the result.”
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The process of achieving Buy-In can be summed up by
Subject A, “You have to be collaborative, you have to be
understanding, and you have to work together. You do not
have the type of authoritarian dictatorness (there’s a
title) that you get in business.”
Implementation
The approval of the procedures and their acceptance by
management was only the first step in the implementation
process. If procedures are not implemented, then their
existence is of little use. Each part of the implementation
process required coordination. Management subjects were
asked what they thought about the process of implementation.
Bob: So how do you think that the university will
implement the recommendations of the task force?
Subject C:

(jokingly) I think we’ll all try to ignore

that it exists ... That’s probably my job. I need to do
some kind of major thing: make it part of our weekly
scans or look for specific recommendations in there and
see if they are getting done.
Subject A thought that the implementation should start
with the centralized portion of IT. “[The] service desk
ought to be taught how to manage [computers] for the
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departments. The service desk [sets] the example at Utah
State University.”
Subject C also stated that new employees to the
organization should be given the new procedures as part of
their hire. “We need to keep [the procedures] up in front
of [the new hires]. What we need is something that that
stands for and represents the Network Managers. [When] new
people coming to the Network Managers, [we can say],
‘Welcome to [the] Network Managers. Here’s everything you
need to know right here.' We [didn’t] have that kind of
thing, [but now we do].”
One way to implement procedures was to make them a part
of a person’s daily routine. Subject A stated, “It becomes
something we use and live by, and I think the more we
mention it in Network Managers [meeting] and have updates
once a quarter and keep this a living document, [the more]
it will have a positive impact. We’ve all said a lot of
[the] network managers are doing a lot of these things
already.”
To make the procedures a “living document,” they must
be kept up to date. As technology changes, some of the
procedures may become redundant, not applicable, or simply
forgotten. Subject C also thought that part of
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implementation included continually revising the documents.
Subject C: So how long do you coast before you look at
it and say, ‘Does anything need to be amended, updated,
changed, or altered?’

Bob: That’s a good question and I think that’s one of
the things I am trying to find out. I think in the
conclusion section of the report, it stated that it
needs to be periodically updated and reviewed.
Subject C: Yeah, obviously—otherwise, it would just
become a misleading document, and then eventually a
harmful one. But [it would become] harmful probably
three or four or five years down the road.
Subject A wondered about the university as a whole. He
stated, “[there are] two directions anything like this can
go. [If it gets] filed [away] and nobody looks at it again,
bad idea.”
Ease-Of-Use
Procedures must be easy for all users to follow,
whether the user is responsible for an entire computer lab
or just one computer. If the procedures are not easy for
everyone to follow, then users will find a way around them,
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leading to a breakdown in security. The procedures were
published as a checklist on the USU website retrieved
January 31, 2013, from
http://it.usu.edu/policies/htm/computer-managementpolicy/computer-management-procedures .

Included next to

each element is the network managers survey score. The
website checklist is located in Appendix B.
Subject B thought that one of the computer management
procedures’ strengths was that they were organized as a
checklist. “I can easily say, ‘Okay, here’s what I need to
do, here’s some I got to have in consideration, and here
are some other suggested things.' I think it’s very simple
and in that form the strength is that it’s got a little
checklist.”
Subject C also thought that the checklist was helpful.
“[If you] got a handout that is available at the service
desk [and you made it] part of the Welcome to USU
package ... I think it would just become part of the
university consciousness. I think that would probably do it.
Something to [give to] new students and something to [hand
out] at the service desk.”
Subject A also saw the procedures as a checklist. For
example, when a non-technical user follows the checklist to
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set up a new computer, “it helps human error not be a big
part of the equation.”
As Subject A was using the checklist component, he
commented:
I actually went through and looked at my own desktop
computer here. I was looking through this morning, and
I said, “Okay, now what have I done, and what have I
not done?” There were some things I hadn’t done. I had
not disabled autorun on my computer. I’m like, “Mmm, I
better do that.”

I have not renamed my local windows

[administrator account]. Some of these I either marked
to do. Some ... I might not have needed. I just haven’t
done some of them. I’m like, “Oh my gosh, I better
figure out how to do that one.” So I think to the
extent that people will use this as a help for
themselves to not forget something, I think it’s going
to be fabulous.
Because the procedures were organized like a checklist,
they were inherently easy to use. All of the subjects
mentioned that the procedures in this form would be easy
for students and others with minimal technical knowledge to
implement. In a university setting, security procedures
needed to be implemented not only by management, but also
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by the students who, with their personal computers, compose
the bulk of users on the campus network. When a large
number of users had implemented the procedures, then
security audits would show whether or not the procedures
were effective.
Effectiveness
Effectiveness of new procedures could only be measured
after the procedures had been fully implemented. After the
procedures were approved, subjects were asked about how
effective they thought the procedures might be.
Subject B thought that for computers that are managed,
the procedures would be a labor-saving solution. “This is
going to be the difference between staying all night and
going home. So people [will want to] put the upfront time
into setting that up on those machines.” However, he
admitted that it would not be the end of all security
problems at USU. “We see computers all the time that are
behind in their updates, but 90 percent of them are not
from computers that are managed.”
Subject A had a pessimistic view of the probable
effectiveness of the procedures due to the biases of the
task force that created them. “I think the decisions in the
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end were more based on feelings of control and convenience
rather than security, as evidenced by the difference in
Windows and Mac [procedures]. I think ... their own
personal feelings got a little more weight than some of the
objectives of good computer management.”
Subject C speculated, “If [the procedures] are
followed and we are lucky, I think we will keep ... the
amount of compromise [at the same level] as what we have
got now.”
Summary of Qualitative Validation
The Chain-Link Fence Model was extrapolated from
observations of the process of creating the computer
management procedures. The subjects interviewed were hired
to be the computer managers of the university; they were
the experts in their field. The three subjects in this
section had no previous knowledge of the Chain-Link Fence
Model. In the interviews, the subjects also independently
validated and confirmed each component of the Chain-Link
Fence Model.
Each of the interviewed subjects stated that they
believed the procedures produced a good result to reduce
the security threat to the university. They stated that the
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procedures followed the components established by the
Chain-Link Fence Model and that those components were what
helped make the security procedures a successful university
process.
Numerical Support for Effectiveness
The reason for creating security procedures was to
reduce the threat to the organization. Many organizations
were required by external policies to conduct security
threat analyses. For example, as part of the Payment Card
Industry (PCI) standards version 2.0, outside security
teams would audit an organization and pretend to present a
security threat. They would conduct penetration tests upon
the networks of their clients to probe for weaknesses. Such
tests are a good measure to evaluate if security procedures
are adequate and if they are being followed. Therefore to
test the security of the institution, this research used a
standard penetration test following the guidelines of PCI
2.0.
USU policy #551 states that all computers connected to
the network must be managed. USU’s policy #555 authorizes
the USU Security Team to conduct weekly penetration tests.
These penetration tests show how well USU will stand up to
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an external hacker's attempt to gain access through the
public internet.
Data, Nessus Report
The product used by USU to facilitate the network
tests was Nessus. Nessus is a server-side product that is
configured to probe every port and service on every IP
address in a network. It discovers potential
vulnerabilities by using a steady stream of plug-ins that
enable the server to access potential security threats in
computer systems. The bulk of these threats are:
•

Computers that are hard-coding an IP address that does
not belong to the computer.

•

Devices that disrupt network operations.

•

Computers that are missing critical system patches.

•

Accessible “Administrator” or “root” usernames with no
password.

•

Embedded appliances with critical, unpatched
vulnerabilities.

•

Printers that are on public (129.123.0.0/16) IP
addresses and are not supposed to offer printing
services to the internet.
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•

Computers that expose or compromise USU credentials.
This includes:
o Failing to protect passwords.
o Failing to protect stored password hashes
o Computers that take no action in the presence of
excessive password guessing

•

Other equipment that exposes USU credentials. This
includes:
o Equipment that replicates and transmits USU
credential in cleartext.
o Old vulnerable backup devices.
o Critical vulnerabilities in older versions of
McAfee, Apache web server, SSH, and PHP
webscripting
o Other software with critical vulnerabilities.
o Unsupported OS. (Retrieved January 31, 2013 from
https://it.wiki.usu.edu/20100513_Nessus_Test)
Analysis of the Data
Permission was granted to use the old data from the

academic school year 2009-2010. On January 20, 2012, the
archives of the Network Managers list was analyzed by
pulling out each week’s vulnerability list for the date
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ranges of this study. Permission was granted from the USU
IT Security Team to use this data, as they deemed it too
old to be of any further threat to the organization.
The following are the results of the Nessus
penetration test. The USU IT Security Team took the
computers that Nessus identified as vulnerable and then
purged any false positives from these results.
Upon compilation of the data, there were multiple gaps
in the results. There should have been either four or five
scans during any one month period. As seen in Figure 4,
most months only have two entries per month.
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Figure 4. Vulnerable computers on the Nessus report.

computers

94

On February 11, 2010 the USU Network Managers group
approved the computer management procedures. The data prior
to February was too incomplete to perform a valid test. As
shown in Figure 4, there was a substantial reduction
between Late August and Early September 2009 compared to
March and April 2010, but too many points of data were lost
to make any statistical conclusions.
Measuring Conclusion
While there is not sufficient statistical support for
any test, there is anecdotal evidence that the
implementation of the security procedures did reduce the
security threat at USU. Computer managers confirmed through
interviews that they believed the procedures were effective
and labor-saving. Subject C stated that, “I believe that we
are doing a better job [reducing compromise] than we ever
have before.” Subject B talked about the labor-savings, “I
see people who have got a lot of machines to run, 200 or
more, that this [the computer management procedures] is
just going to save their bacon.” This helps demonstrate
that the Effectiveness component of the Chain-Link Fence
Model was necessary to reducing the overall security threat
footprint of the organization.
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VALIDATION OF THE CHAIN-LINK FENCE MODEL PART 2: USING THE
CHAIN-LINK FENCE MODEL TO CREATE SECURITY PROCEDURES AT
UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY
Procedure Development Using the Chain-Link Fence Model
Utah State University is unique, given the distributed
nature of information technology. While USU has centralized
servers, services, and top-to-bottom management, it also
has several departments and colleges that maintain their
own IT teams. While there are drawbacks to this system,
they are overshadowed by the benefits. Subject A stated it
best:
“Utah State University will never, if I have anything
to say about it, be absolutely fully centralized with IT
with absolutely everything and anything that has to do with
information technology because it doesn’t make sense. The
things that make sense for centralization are those things
which are used commonly, relatively equally across, say, 80
to 90 percent of the institution. Those [are the] things
that make sense to centralize and pass on [as a] common
service. There are a million things at this university and
millions and millions of dollars worth of things at this
University that are very specific to certain disciplines
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and certain processes [that] the rest of the university
[couldn’t] care less about. Those situations should not be
restricted at all by any form of centralization at Utah
State University. Centralization should assist them so they
don’t have to focus on some commoditized things, but that’s
as far as it should go. Ownership, the funding, the systems,
the processes that are specific and not generalizable at
the University, I believe should always be at the edge.
Otherwise needs won’t be met.”
In order for each department to “be at the edge,”
their IT professionals needed to have the freedom to create
internal IT security policies and procedures.
The Interview Process
Throughout January of 2011, the Chain-Link Fence Model
was taught to four additional subjects, subjects D through
G (see Appendix D). They were then asked to use the model
to create security procedures for their respective labs.
They responded by using the model to create procedures as
well as performing other duties related to their jobs.
During 2011, Subjects D through G were interviewed about
their experiences using the Chain-Link Fence Model.
Subjects were asked about how they used parts of the
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Chain-Link Fence Model for their computer labs. Buy-In for
a computer lab was more complex than that of an
organization. There were two different groups that needed
to cooperate with the departmental procedures: Buy-In for
the managers was easy because they wrote the procedures and
Buy-In for lab consultants was slightly harder because they
needed to be taught the hows and whys of the procedures. In
the case of a computer lab, the users fit the traditional
customer role of a business rather than the service role.
This made them more adversarial to the Buy-In process.
In relation to Implementation, questions were asked
about training procedures for the labs. For Ease-of-use,
subjects were asked how their labs related to a users’ home
experience and how they thought their labs were similar or
different. Effectiveness for each case is discussed as a
whole at the end of the cases.
Case Study 1, Security Incident Response
and Time Limit Procedures
Subject D managed all the computers in the computer
science department. His computer lab, an open-access lab,
consisted of 150 computers. He had a unique challenge among
campus lab managers in that his computers needed to be as
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open as possible so that students could explore all facets
of the computing environment. This created some issues,
especially with computer security.
The students in Subject D’s lab often behaved like
typical hackers. They tried to learn what was going on in
the computer environment. This included attempting to spoof
IP addresses, changing root level file structures, and in
some cases, attempting to present themselves as a different
user.
One of the main differences between his lab
environment and all the others was the fact that it was an
anonymous lab. There was not a centralized authentication
system requirement for entry; most of the computers had
root or administrator access set as the default user
credentials. Finally, they did not have the usual
firewalled and sectioned-off subnets found in other openaccess labs on campus. As Subject D stated, “The systems
are somewhat open because in computer science, we’ve got
students that have to develop a lot of programs where they
need a fair amount of resources off the Internet. They need
to be able to come back after they’ve worked on it and keep
working on a project.”
When a breach in security was detected, Subject D
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created (using the Chain-Link Fence Model) a standard
procedure for processing the problem computer. He
summarized this procedure: “We do let USU computer security
indicate if somebody is doing something out of the ordinary,
and then we reimage the computers. If we catch anyone doing
something that is a security breach we just reimage the
computers [and] bring it back to a known operative state.
The students are warned before they go in that they do have
open computers because of their development platforms, and
they have to police themselves.”
While this environment seems like the Wild Wild West
of computer environments to most computer security
professionals, designed procedures helped keep the chaos to
a minimum. “We do have firewalls on each of the systems
which we use: standard Windows 7 and Macintosh and Linux
firewalls. We allow basically any [outgoing traffic]. [We]
usually limit incoming [traffic] so students can’t run
their own applications unless we poke a hole in the
firewalls. That’s about all we do, because again, they
still need to access resources off campus as they’re
developing some of their distribution software.”
Subject D used the Chain-Link Fence Model for the
creation of a time-limit procedure.
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Subject D: If we’ve got someone who is in [the lab]
for an extended period of time, the lab mangers ... or
the consultants ask them what they are doing ... We
give them about three hours, mainly because the games
players come in, play for like six [hours]. So after
about three hours we ask them what they’re doing.
Normally, they feel intimidated and get up and leave,
but the games players are the worst case. Most of the
rest of the students are in and out of the lab in
about an hour to two.
Buy-in. In his lab, Subject D needed his lab managers
to assist him in enforcing these new procedures. “We
discuss those at the first of the school year like we did
at the end of August. [We review] what’s [been] implemented
[and] anything that’s changed in the campus infrastructure
during the summer, and they’re basically the policeman of
the of the lab operations.”
Implementation. One of the primary concerns for
Subject D was the students. He wanted to make sure that the
students knew what the procedures of the lab included. To
that end he has training sessions with the students. “I
think we have enough ... training for the incoming students
to warn them enough if they ... start doing anything
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malicious that they will be out of the program, and they
usually watch fairly closely. So ... we’ve had them in the
past, but in the last eight years up here we’ve ... not had
a documented case of malice.”
When discussing implementation Subject D also stated
that he was also implementing the Utah State University
security procedures.
“[I implement the procedures outlined by USU] as close as
possible, other than possibly the Deep Freeze issue.” Deep
Freeze is a program used to prevent anybody from altering
any part of a computer system. It is a third-party
application that forces the computers to return to a
predefined and static state upon reboot. He continued,
“Some lab managers use it; Engineering has [used it] a
little bit, but they have found the same thing that I have-that the students get limited ... to what they can do in
some of their development. And so I’ve opted to move away
from it just because we have enough changes during the
semester [that] make it just hard for them to manage. But
typically, as far as security monitoring, I follow the
guidelines that we’ve created on the Managers list... The
Deep Freeze is probably the trickiest just because it
[doesn’t seem] complicated, but it requires a complete
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reimage of the lab. If we need to make any changes or if
the students need particular updates and so on so forth,
[the lab would have to create a specialized procedure to
handle the request under a Deep Freeze environment].
Ease-of-use. In Subject D's lab, the systems were as
wide open as possible. This gave the student users a chance
to explore their systems to further their education. This
helped them feel knowledgeable with their use of the
systems. Subject D wanted his lab to be run with focus on
ease-of-use for his students.
Bob: If you were to compare your lab computers to a
user’s home computer, how are they similar? And how
are they different? Let’s start with similar.
Subject D:

Similar in the fact that they are fairly

open. A user’s home computer ... is fairly open. [We
have] an unlimited firewall as far as outgoing, so
they can go anywhere they want. [There are] some
limitations on the incoming [firewall and] on ... the
university’s border firewall. Where they [the lab
computers] would be different is [that] a home user’s
computer probably isn’t monitored for patch updates.
People don’t necessarily look down at the [system tray]
to see if it’s up to date. With lab computers, the
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consultants go around and make sure that the scans are
all happening either automatically or [forced]. A home
computer user is not necessarily going to look for
security updates or virus scanning spyware updates and
probably also isn’t necessarily going to look for
required updates to the computer that don’t happen
automatically. [Also,] some of the optional updates
that still could be security related ... may not be
updated on a home computer.
Case Study 2, Joining a Central Domain
Subject E managed the computers in the College of
Humanities and Social Sciences. His users mostly used the
computers for composing papers, creating news stories, or
blogging. In contrast to the computer science department,
Subject E’s users were complete novices in computer
security.
Bob: How would you rate your users’ knowledge of
information security?
Subject E: I would probably say close to zero. As new
freshman are coming in, I’m not sure that they have
much knowledge of security and policies regarding that
[security].
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Consequently, he felt that it was his duty to keep his
systems secure for the users, which resulted in his
computers being some of the most locked down systems on
campus. He achieved this by following these procedures
created using the Chain-Link Fence Model:
1. All computers were connected to the college domain.
This ensured that accounts and print counts could
be managed centrally.
2. All computers were required to have Deep Freeze
installed on them.
3. All computers were connected to the System Center
Configuration Manager (SCCM) server. This ensured
that most of the university computer management
procedures were being met.
4. All computers were reimaged at the beginning of
each academic school year.
All of these steps ensured that none of the systems had
any trace of customization by the users of the systems.
This had the added benefit of forcing most of the
configuration work upfront. This type of lab management
comes from a belief that the greatest security threat is
from within.
Bob: What would you say is the greatest security threat
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to your lab?
Subject E: The greatest security threat to our lab is a
knowledgeable student that might know how to disable
Deep Freeze and install things.
Bob: You’re saying an internal hacker?
Subject E: Yeah. I don’t foresee an external hacker
getting in too easily and permanently making any
changes.
Buy-in. The use of the utility Deep Freeze forces the
computers to not have the ability to save any data to the
hard drive. This caused Subject E the most difficulty in
terms of buy-in from the users. He stated that the extreme
security measures that they take cause some complaints.
“Once in a while we get a complaint that ... they [the
users] can’t save anything to the computers.”
Ease-of-use. Subject E's labs were closed tight, only
allowing very limited use of the computer environment. This
could have an effect on the abilities of the users to
operate the computer.
Bob: If you were to compare your lab to a user’s home
computer how, is the experience similar, and how is
the experience different?
Subject E: Let’s start with how it’s different. Most
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home computers don’t need to log in; that’s just how
it is. There is generally no password on a home
computer, and here you have to have a login to get
into it. Also on our lab computers, [users] can’t save
anything at all. On a home computer, you can save
whatever you want, including viruses and malware and
everything. Those are the main differences. How it’s
similar is [that] they can browse the web [and] they
can print just like they would be able to at home. So
that pretty much covers it.
Implementation. When a computer was joined to the
university domain, the user account lost the ability to
have administrative privileges. This caused the user to not
be able to install software, printers, and other advanced
computers settings. Subject E was asked him how this
affected the implementation of his procedures:
Bob: Do you follow all of the [procedures] as created?
Subject E: I would say 90 percent of them.
Bob: Okay, which procedures are the most difficult for
you to maintain or follow?
Subject E: I would say the one we’re having the most
difficulty with is having users not have administrator
privileges. We’re doing okay on Windows machines, but
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on Mac, people tend to have a mentality that they
should have complete control over their Macintosh
system. So I would say that is the top of the list of
[procedures] that are difficult to follow.
Case Study 3, Standard Security Response Procedures
Subject F's situation was unique given that he was the
sole manager at the departmental level. While the other
subjects had lab consultants, Subject F was the sole
administrator for his lab. His lab consisted of 30
Macintosh computers. The users of his lab had a unique logon that was enforced by an Open-Directory Domain. The
computers were unique due to the fact that he had them set
in dual boot configurations with Microsoft Windows. Each of
his Windows installations was a stand-alone workstation
without access to a central server.
Subject F kept the default guest account on his
computers to help facilitate sharing of information between
registered and non-registered users of his lab. The guest
account could not save to either the server or locally to
the computer itself. The use of the guest account was for
log-on purposes only.
The majority of his users were students that
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specialize in using technology in the education field. He
had about 150 people use his lab in a given week. In
addition, many classes were held in the lab.
His approach to security was as follows: “I kind of
look at security as [encompassing] both information
[security] and physical [security]. So [on] the physical
security side, there [are] locks on both doors, and the
only people who are allowed in there are those who have
access codes, which they are given the first day of school.
I don’t hand out the codes. The codes are handed out by
either by the instructor or the office staff so they can
verify that they are a student, because I don’t have access
to that information.”
“Information security--I guess I don’t really worry
too much about it just because of the way I’ve got these
accounts set up so that they can’t do anything. But if they
do, then I usually catch it ... I can know who is logged in
when they are logged in. If anything goes wrong with [the
computers], it’s just a reboot that refreshes it. So
there’s not a whole lot there that I worry about, mostly
‘cause they are using [the] Mac side.” When questioned why
he did not worry about information security, he responded,
“I just let the university handle most of that because I am
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not really equipped to do it.”
In his office, Subject F set up a computer workstation
with multiple displays. On each display were 30 open
windows. Each window corresponded to one of the computers
in the lab. He was able to see at a glance what is being
displayed on each computer.
His specialized setup was created in response to the
lab’s greatest threat, Bit Torrent. Bit Torrent is a peerto-peer file sharing protocol that can be used to quickly
distribute copyrighted material.
Subject F: Bit Torrent was the issue we had last year
[when] one of our instructors was teaching and using
Windows. [A student] discovered that [the lab] has a
really fast internet connection in there. What they
did is they’d log in as just as a standard user. They
logged in as a student and they used about twelve
machines and started downloading all kinds of crap. I
got the message from [the copyright compliance
security team member] and he said ‘[we got a DMCA
violation],’ and I said, ‘It’s a lab. I’ve no idea
who’s logged in there, and all I can do is just clean
them up.’ And he says ‘Okay.’ But what created the
problem [was Windows being able] to log into the
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servers. [I need to] have them connected to a domain
so that I can restrict those users as I do the Mac
users. [I have the computer set up to] log in and
they’re standard users now, [but] sometimes the
student needs the ability to do some installations. I
have to allow that on a case-by case-basis. [With]
Windows, most things you install you have to restart.
Bob: So can you just run Deep Freeze?
Subject F: If you’ve got Deep Freeze installed it just
wipes out everything they have, so it’s a different
animal. But ... I need to know who’s logged in and
when, so that’s what I’ve been trying to solve.
Subject F created the following procedure to help
manage his lab:
1. create Location Based Names,
2. create DNS entries on Aggies domain,
3. create deployment image,
4. re-image the computers,
5. verify with [RADIUS server administrator] that
authentication works, and
6. verify that Aggies Domain services are correct.
Buy-in. As with Subject E, Subject F joined the
Windows installations to the university domain, once again
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removing administrative privileges from the computers.
Subject F recalled a problem with Buy-In.
Subject F: I would say those who want to use Windows
don’t like the fact that they can’t do installations
or make some changes to tweak stuff. We have
[suggestion cards] from the students [saying] they
like to do things that are more advanced that they
can’t do in a regular lab. So my lab gets used as a
guinea pig quite a bit. They [may not] like the fact
that they have to come ask me to install something ...
but they get it over it ... they kind of understand.
Bob: How many complaints do you get in any given week?
Subject F: I’d say maybe one or two per semester.
Bob:

Ok, so one or two per semester.

Subject F: It’s really low--I think ... with the
advanced understanding of the students and faculty,
they understand what the issues are [and] why it needs
to be that way.
Ease-of-use. The computer lab that Subject F managed
catered to two different groups of users. The first was the
traditional student users (i.e., students who used the lab
to work on their projects, papers, and other school work).
The second user group was the instructors. They used the
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lab to teach students and, as a result, had a different
standard for ease-of-use. Subject F's computer lab was
Macintosh based.
Bob: If you were to compare your lab to one of your
users’ home computers, what would you say are their
similarities and their differences?
Subject F: Biggest difference is my machines are
clean--very clean. There’s no extraneous software,
there’s no orphans there’s no stuff left behind. The
similarities: I try to create an environment that
looks and acts as much like a home computer as
possible. So the only difference is when they’re
logged in, they’re working off a server. But it
doesn’t look that way, so that’s the thing ... you’d
call it a similarity, but yet it’s a difference at the
same time. But as far these machines compared to their
home machines? These ones run a lot better.
Implementation. Due to the fact that Subject F ran the
lab alone, the implementation of policy was very straight
forward. However, teaching his users how this policy would
affect them was a little more difficult.
Bob: How much training do you provide your users?
Subject F: I’ll meet with [the instructors] before the

113

semester starts and let them know what’s happening,
and then I’ll expect them to [see] if it affects the
students. [I] let them explain it to [the students]
and let them do it. [As a result], the normal users
hardly at all ... knock on my door and ask for some
help.
Bob: So you train the faculty in any new things,
changes, or anything [else] to the lab, and you expect
the faculty then teach their students who are using
the lab those changes?
Subject F: Because it seems like the information gets
to the students a lot better that way.
Subject F stated that the total amount of time to train the
faculty was around an hour, while the first day of classes
was spent training the students.
Case Study 4, Computer Refresh Policy
Subject G had the largest number of computer labs and
the largest number of computers. His labs accounted for 80
percent of all the open access labs across the campus. He
created policies to deal with the sheer volume of students
that used his lab computers. Over 3500 students used his
system every day. With that many users, he needed
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procedures that ensured that students could always have
access to a computer to complete their work.
Bob: So how many people help you manage all of your
labs?
Subject G: There are 82 of them.
Bob: Are there assistant lab managers? What are their
job titles and responsibilities?
Subject G: There are 82 consultants that man the
facilities throughout the area. Then I have six peer
managers. And these peer managers help me out with the
PC, the Mac, HR, supplies, training, [and] public
relations.
Subject G articulated the greatest security threat to
his lab: “From my point of view, it’s the physical security,
but from the student’s point of view, it’s being
compromised.”
After reading the university’s computer management
policy, Subject G realized that he needed to create
specific procedures. He was asked to use the Chain-Link
Fence Model to guide their creation. He agreed and came up
with the following procedures:
Computer cycle between users policy. It became the
policy of this lab that computers not in use for more than
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15 minutes would be recycled to a refreshed state.
This policy was supported by the following procedures:
1. the computers will have a self-timer installed so
they reboot automatically after 15 minutes of idle,
2. the computer will use Deep Freeze to ensure that
the state of the computer is free from any user’s
customization, and
3. lab consultants will make sure that any computer
not in use will be at the log-on screen.
Subject G reported that these new procedures accomplished
his goal of making more computers available to users.
Buy-In. Subject G had multiple lab consultants, and he
indicated no problems with their Buy-In to the program. He
also stated that most of the issue with lab consultant BuyIn was handled in the multiple training sessions that they
conducted.
Bob: Do your lab managers support your lab policies?
Subject G: Yes.
Bob: I mean, and I’m not talking about forcible
[acceptance]. Overall, do they understand why you’re
doing what you are doing?
Subject G: Yes, they are trained. We do training quite
heavily at the first of the year.
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Ease-of-use. Each student who used an on-campus
computer lab had a different computing experience,
depending on which departmental lab they chose to use.
Because all of the lab managers had some students
using their computers, they were then questioned about
the students’ experiences.
Lab managers made their computers easy for students to
use by making them look and feel as much as possible like a
home computer. To make a lab easy to use and manage for
consultants, lab managers needed to provide proper training.
Subject G had the most lab consultants. We discussed
how he trained his consultants in order to make the labs
easy for them to use and manage.
Bob: You mentioned previously that [for lab manager
training] you’ve got the four hours once a month and
on Saturdays, and you’ve got the eight hours at the
beginning of the semester.
Subject G: Correct
Bob: how much of that training time is dedicated to
security? And so, what I’m asking is how long does it
take to train your managers, your lab managers, in
regards to security-related issues?
Subject G: I would say out of those first two
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meetings ... about an hour in the first meeting in
September, and another hour in the second meeting in
September for everyone. So the first one is for new
consultants only, they get about an hour, I’d say
maybe an hour and a half training on security. Then
the next week with all the staff, you get about an
hour of security training. Then every month there is
probably ... ten to fifteen minutes of discussion
about security.
Implementation. The labs were a vital part of the
university's overall mission to educate its students. The
university adopted security policies and procedures to
ensure that students had the most secure environment
possible in which to work. Procedures could not be
effective unless they are implemented. Subjects were asked
how closely they followed the university’s computer
management procedures.
Bob: Your lab managers, do they support your lab
policies?
Subject G: Yes.
Bob: I mean, and I’m not talking about forcible, I’m
talking about like overall, do they understand why
you’re doing what you are doing?
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Subject G: Yes, they are trained. We do training quite
heavily at the first of the year. We do ... a whole
bunch of training.”
Subject G: “The first staff meeting we have, we have
[name] come in from Affirmative Action and talk about
sexual harassment prevention. We have [name] come in
and talk about PCI compliance and [personally
identifying information], and all of that. We talk
about that. Then we have [name] from the registrar’s
office to talk about FERPA [Family Educational Rights
and Privacy Act]. And those are some [of the]
trainings that we bring people in to do to talk about
certain things. Then we have our own training on
security. How [we] handle certain things. The first
training meeting is about six hours on the first
Saturday for the new staff. Then we have the six hour
training again the following Saturday for all of the
staff, returning and new. And we continue ...
training ... and security has been one [of the topics]
that, over the years, has come to the top all of the
time. It just, keeps coming up higher and higher and
been talked about almost every time on different parts
of security for the students.

119

Bob: So how much training do you provide your staff
versus how much do you have to provide all the way
down to the user level?
Subject G: The staff ... is trained heavily the first
month. Thereafter, it’s four hours, once a month on
Saturday mornings. And what was your second part of
your question?
Bob:

How much training do you provide to your users?

Subject G: [I wish we could do more]. [The University
IT] fair ... that was wonderful. That was good
training... We have some tutorials out there for them.
Other than that, I don’t think there is much training
at all.
Bob: Your user base is 16,000 students. So, what
resources do you provide to train your students?
Subject G: Oh ok, yeah we do a little bit. We do have
Connections (USU’s freshman and new student
orientation program). We do Connections where we
get ... 1800 hundred students [mostly] freshman. We
have an hour with them at the beginning before school
starts in the fall, where we have an hour of training
on IT technology, and we go over a whole bunch of
things ... Security is a big part of that [training].
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We go over emails, what to watch for in [email]. We go
over a whole bunch of stuff that covers IT, more than
just security. [We also discuss] IT technology and
what’s offered [as services to the students] and where
to go find things and look for things.
Review of the Effectiveness of the Chain-Link Fence Model
in Procedure Creation of All Four Cases

As stated previously, the effectiveness of security
procedures could only be measured after the procedures had
been fully implemented. This could be accomplished using an
audit system. The university used the Nessus product to
conduct a weekly penetration test on every computer
connected to the university network.
Each lab manager was asked how often his computers are
listed as “vulnerable” or “problem” computers on the Nessus
scan. This data helped indicate whether or not their
security procedures were working. All of the interviewed
subjects stated that over the past year, none of their lab
computers had come up on the Nessus scan. They were then
asked if any of the other computers that they maintained
for their departments came up on the scan. Everyone
reported that about one or two per month.
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The issues that most commonly caused the subjects’
computers to appear on the Nessus scan were mostly resolved
by the implementation of their new procedures. Subjects
were asked if they currently had any compromised computers
that they knew about. Subject D had a major issue with one
of his main servers. It was discovered that a computer that
was used to submit homework had its root username and
password hacked by an IP address originating in China. The
USU IT Security team discovered this compromise using a
statistical analysis to find anomalies in SSH patterns. SSH
is a program used to remotely control a computer running
the Unix operating system.
The compromised server acted as a rogue IRC bot and
tried to infect other computers across the campus. More
than 30 man-hours went into resolving this problem. Subject
D reported that, luckily, this server did not include any
personal identifying information.
It is important to note that this security episode was
the only report of a compromised computer (out of the four
subjects questioned) during the course of an entire year.
That single computer was out of the 150 lab computers and
100 faculty and staff computers that Subject D managed.
This supports the supposition that the procedures created
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using the Chain-Link Fence Model created a safe computing
environment.
Conclusion of the Case Studies
Computer security is a goal for any size organization.
The labs in these case studies, while part of a larger
organization, demonstrated how effective procedures could
help reduce the exposure of small computing environments to
security threats. The use of the Chain-Link Fence Model in
these labs helped the lab managers come up with solutions
to security problems. They found the model to be effective
in producing the results that they were aiming to achieve.
These new security procedures were recognized by the
managers as beneficial and helped reduced their overall
security footprint. The procedures were used by the
managers and users to great success. As more of these new
security procedures come on line, the entire organization’s
IS security will likely increase both from the reduction of
threats and also from user awareness. While some users
complain about the less convenient use of some computers,
the users of these labs see these new security procedures
and are educated about the benefits of good information
technology security.
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A final comment about the case study is that the
Chain-Link Fence Model was a useful tool to help design and
create security procedures. The Chain-Link Fence Model
helped users realize their unstated goal of wanting to
ensure that their computer use was protected and secure.
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FINAL CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION
Summary of the Chain-Link Fence Model and its Validation
The Chain-Link Fence Model (CLFM) is a four component
model to help information technology security specialists
design and implement new, effective, and creative security
procedures for their organizations. Information technology
security once concerned only hard-wired computers. In the
recent past, it has ballooned to encompass wired and
wireless computers, as well as other wireless consumer
devices that have a primary function other than that of a
computer. Televisions, video games, cell phones, and even
books in the form of electronic readers have now become
devices that are able to transmit data over the internet.
As technology continues to change, there will continue to
be a need for security procedures to be created and revised.
The Chain-Link Fence Model was developed to be
replicable. Each of the components, Buy-In, Implementation,
Ease-of-use, and Effectiveness, were derived from both
previous research and knowledge gained over lifetimes of
experience. The model and its components, when used as a
framework, help create information technology security
procedures.
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This model was validated in two parts. The first part
validated the individual components using expert knowledge.
The second part validated the entire model and the
capabilities thereof. The first validation helped give
cohesion to the model as a whole.
The managers’ experience with the Chain-Link Fence
Model, as stated in the interviews, showed that the
components of the Chain-Link Fence Model, Buy-In,
Implementation, Ease-of-Use, and Effectiveness, facilitated
the creation of the new security procedures that in turn
were well understood by both the users of the systems.
Conclusions
Conclusion 1: The usefulness of the CLFM is a consequence
of its origin in theory, observation, and IT professional
insight.
The Chain-Link Fence Model was a valuable tool in
helping create and implement security policies and
procedures. The model and its components were developed
based on careful study of related literature and on the
author’s personal observations. The synthesis of previous
theoretical results and the author’s practical experiences
resulted in the parsimonious model where all components
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were essential, interconnected, and sufficient to achieve
the stated goal of providing guidelines for the development
of new security policies and procedures.
The experts stated that each component would help the
culture of the university accept the security procedures.
In the second validation part, some experienced members in
information technology security at Utah State University
used their training in Chain-Link Fence Model to develop
new security policies for their specific situations. They
stated that CLFM was useful in helping them form the new
security procedures. These managers, using their expertise
to create procedures using this model, were instrumental in
determining the model’s usefulness in their individual
domains.
Conclusion 2: The Chain-Link Fence Model is a scalable
model for the creation of security procedures in large or
small computer environments.
Through the creation of a set of four new, diverse
examples of security procedures it was demonstrated that
one could use the Chain-Link Fence Model to create
procedures for labs and networks of varying sizes. Lab
managers at USU used the Chain-Link Fence Model to create
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procedures for small computing environments with one lab
composed of only 25 computers. The computer lab managers
stated that the computers they managed did not appear on
the weekly vulnerability assessment with the help of their
security procedures they developed using the Chain-Link
Fence Model. In both the large and small cases, the
policies and procedures were positively correlated with the
reductions of the security threat footprints that appeared
on the university’s security tests and measures.
Conclusion 3: The Chain-Link Fence Model may reduce the
effort needed to create and implement procedures.
The computer lab managers using the Chain-Link Fence
Model stated that once they had created the procedures,
they were able to train their staff and faculty in as
little as one or two training sessions and no training
whatsoever in one case. This helped get the procedures out
to the front lines in less time, resulting in quicker, more
effective security threat reduction. These four examples
suggested that using the Chain-Link Fence Model can reduce
the time and perhaps cost required to develop security
procedures.
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Weaknesses
While it is clear from the interviews that the users
of the Chain-Link Fence Model found the model effective,
the design and nature of this study does not provide
statistical evidence to support that claim. A new study
design could focus upon gathering hard data to establish
quantitative evidence. For such an undertaking to be
effective, data collection will need to concentrate on
gathering sufficient data from before and after the
implementation of newly developed security policies.
A second weakness of the study arises from the nature
of the university environment where the study was conducted.
Any security breach related data collected between the
months of May and August would be biased, due to the fact
that usage rate falls dramatically during the academic
break period. There are significantly fewer students on
campus during the summer, and therefore, far fewer
computers are connected to the network. This would cause
any samples from those dates to bias the results. However,
this could be partially offset by a seasonally adjusted
usage rate. Any such considerations were outside of the
scope of this study.
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A final weakness is that the Chain-Link Fence model
was validated and tested at only one university environment.
While this creates an excellent environment for conducting
research, any conclusion drawn from the research can only
be directly applicable to that one university. For a full,
complete evaluation, the Chain-Link Fence Model needs to be
tested on other types of organizations.
Future Research
In the future, this study could be replicated in
different organizational settings. The CLFM was used in
large and small environments, but because the small
environments tested were a part of the larger, there was
only a relatively small variation in organizational culture
and management structure. The university studied was a
large public university. Smaller private universities and
colleges face different overall threats to their external
security. Most small private universities focus on a
traditional liberal arts education. As a result, external
hackers would mainly see them as a source of computing
resources rather than as a source of a large body of
research. Other environments such as hospitals, secure
laboratories, and other large entities could benefit by
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applying the Chain-Link Fence Model for IT security to
their institutions. These institutions could be selected
due to the similar requirements of data on their
institutions. After applying the Chain-Link Fence Model at
these institutions, the research could then be expanded to
broader business and industry environments as well.
Additionally, the Chain-Link Fence Model could be
studied further: refinement of each of the four components,
path analysis of each of the components and how they relate
to each other, and finally, exploration of possible
additional components that may emerge in different
environments than the one presented.
Each component of the Chain-Link Fence Model could be
analyzed to see whether there are any sub-points within
each component. Additionally, future studies could identify
possible overlapping points in subcomponent. These
subcomponents could include instructions or provisions for
testing each of the main components during the creation of
the procedures. These subcomponents could be used to design
a more detailed outline for the creation of security
procedures.
The Chain-Link Fence Model is a model to help
organizations reach their security goals. This model is
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just one tool that information technology security
professionals can use to help accomplish their goals.
Models and security research only explain human behavior.
The true goal of any security professional is to understand
how humans interact and to realize that technology is just
part of the communication of human society.
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APPENDIX B: Security Setup
Windows Standard Setup
Note: Only the procedures in the top tier (Required) are considered minimum requirements; the
inclusion of any other steps is left to the discretion of the IT professional.

Required

Rating
Average

Install/configure anti-virus software

4.95

Configure automatic Windows updates

4.80

Register IP address in OpenIPAM

4.55

Install/configure firewall software

4.37

Update drivers

4.27

Disable the local Windows Guest account

4.12

Disable auto-run

3.39

Recommended
Employ secure user password policies (complexity, length, expiration)

3.94

Convert file system to NTFS

3.91

Uninstall "bloatware"

3.79

Install/configure anti-malware software

3.79

Install/configure SCCM

3.29

Reformat hard drive and install Windows from scratch

3.11

Configure least necessary privileges for the computer owner's account

3.05

Configure automatic third-party software updates, when available (e.g., Adobe Updater)

3.05

Disable all unnecessary services (e.g., utilize Windows Baseline Security Analyzer)

2.94

Rename local Administrator account

2.52

Disable Administrator account

1.85

Optional
Employ a backup solution (e.g., shadow copy, store-to-network, portable external drive)

2.94

Configure services to use non-default ports (e.g., Remote Desktop)

2.88

Employ security-related group policies via Active Directory (i.e., join Windows domain)

2.82

Install/disallow certain web browsers

2.82

Install security protections specific to installed web browser(s) (e.g., FireFox No Script plug-in)

2.69

Configure power management options

2.68

Employ security-related local group policies

2.60

Install/configure third-party software update notifiers (e.g., Secunia Personal Software Inspector)

2.52

Install Windows from an actively maintained image (e.g., Ghost)

2.50

Install Windows from scratch with slipstreamed service packs and/or patches

2.41

Rename the local Windows Guest account

2.41

Remove local administrator privileges from computer owner's user account

2.40
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Configure browser to automatically purge browsing history

2.20

Encrypt the hard drive

1.33

Windows High Security Setup
Note: Only the procedures in the top tier (Required) are considered minimum requirements; the inclusion
of any other steps is left to the discretion of the IT professional.

Required

Rating
Average

Install/configure anti-virus software

4.95

Configure automatic Windows updates

4.80

Register IP address in OpenIPAM

4.55

Install/configure firewall software

4.37

Update drivers

4.27

Disable the local Windows Guest account

4.12

Employ secure user password policies (complexity, length, expiration)

3.94

Convert file system to NTFS

3.91

Install/configure anti-malware software

3.79

Disable auto-run

3.39

Reformat hard drive and install Windows from scratch

3.11

Remove local administrator privileges from computer owner's user account
Configure browser to automatically purge browsing history (e.g., temp Internet files, cookies, history,
form data, passwords)

2.40

Disable Administrator account

1.85

Encrypt the hard drive

1.33

2.20

Recommended
Uninstall "bloatware"

3.79

Install/configure SCCM

3.29

Configure least necessary privileges for the computer owner's account

3.05

Configure automatic third-party software updates, when available (e.g., Adobe Updater)

3.05

Disable all unnecessary services (e.g., utilize Windows Baseline Security Analyzer)

2.94

Rename local Administrator account

2.52

Optional
Employ a backup solution (e.g., shadow copy, store-to-network, portable external drive)

2.94

Configure services to use non-default ports (e.g., Remote Desktop)

2.88

Employ security-related group policies via Active Directory (i.e., join Windows domain)

2.82

Install/disallow certain web browsers

2.82

Install security protections specific to installed web browser(s) (e.g., FireFox No Script plug-in)

2.69

Configure power management options

2.68
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Employ security-related local group policies

2.60

Install/configure third-party software update notifiers (e.g., Secunia Personal Software Inspector)

2.52

Install Windows from an actively maintained image (e.g., Ghost)

2.50

Install Windows from scratch with slipstreamed service packs and/or patches

2.41

Rename the local Windows Guest account

2.41

Macintosh Standard Setup
Note: Only the procedures in the top tier (Required) are considered minimum requirements; the inclusion
of any other steps is left to the discretion of the IT professional.

Required

Rating
Average

Perform Software Updates

5.00

Configure automatic Software Updates

4.75

Register IP address in OpenIPAM

4.46

Install/configure firewall software

4.40

Configure automatic third-party software updates, when available (e.g., Adobe Updater)

3.73

Disable the local Guest account

3.43

Install computer owner's various software products

3.17

Employ secure user password policies (complexity, length, expiration)

3.00

Remove local administrator privileges from computer owner's user account

2.65

Configure least necessary privileges for the computer owner's account

2.50

Rename local administrator account

2.50

Disable administrator account

2.00

Recommended
Install/configure anti-virus software

3.64

Employ a backup solution (e.g., Time Machine, store-to-network, portable external drive)

2.83

Configure services to utilize non-default ports (e.g., Remote Desktop)

2.80

Install/configure third-party software update notifiers (e.g., Secunia)

2.58

Employ security-related group policies (i.e., join Open Directory domain)

2.57

Configure power management options

2.57

Install/configure anti-malware software

2.56

Install security protections specific to installed web browser(s) (e.g., FireFox No Script plug-in)

2.48

Install/configure SCCM

2.47

Configure Permitted Applications

2.20

Configure browser to automatically purge browsing history

2.14

Optional
Install third-party web browsers (e.g., FireFox)

3.52

Reformat hard drive and install Mac OS X from scratch

2.89
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Convert file system to other file structure (e.g., UFS)

1.92

Install Windows via virtual machine (e.g., Parallels, VMWare Fusion)

1.92

Rename the local Guest account

1.89

Configure Simple Finder

1.71

Install Windows via BootCamp

1.63

Encrypt the hard drive

1.13

Macintosh High Security Setup
Note: Only the procedures in the top tier (Required) are considered minimum requirements; the inclusion
of any other steps is left to the discretion of the IT professional.

Perform Software Updates

Rating
Average
5.00

Configure automatic Software Updates

4.75

Register IP address in OpenIPAM

4.46

Install/configure firewall software

4.40

Configure automatic third-party software updates, when available (e.g., Adobe Updater)

3.73

Disable the local Guest account

3.43

Install computer owner's various software products

3.17

Employ secure user password policies (complexity, length, expiration)

3.00

Remove local administrator privileges from computer owner's user account

2.65

Configure least necessary privileges for the computer owner's account

2.50

Rename local administrator account

2.50

Disable administrator account

2.00

Configure Simple Finder

1.71

Encrypt the hard drive

1.13

Configure Permitted Applications

2.20

Install/configure anti-virus software

3.64

Employ a backup solution (e.g., Time Machine, store-to-network, portable external drive)

2.83

Configure services to utilize non-default ports (e.g., Remote Desktop)

2.80

Install/configure third-party software update notifiers (e.g., Secunia)

2.58

Employ security-related group policies (i.e., join Open Directory domain)

2.57

Configure power management options

2.57

Install/configure anti-malware software

2.56

Install security protections specific to installed web browser(s) (e.g., FireFox No Script plug-in)

2.48

Install/configure SCCM

2.47

Configure browser to automatically purge browsing history

2.14
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Install third-party web browsers (e.g., FireFox)

3.52

Reformat hard drive and install Mac OS X from scratch

2.89

Convert file system to other file structure (e.g., UFS)

1.92

Install Windows via virtual machine (e.g., Parallels, VMWare Fusion)

1.92

Rename the local Guest account

1.89

Install Windows via BootCamp

1.63

Windows & Macintosh Ongoing Maintenance
Note: The following recommendation is generic for both Windows and Macintosh systems, but some
procedures may be OS-specific. Only the procedures in the top tier (orange) are considered minimum
requirements; the inclusion of any other steps is left to the discretion of the IT professional.

Patch OS with available updates

Rating
Average
4.95

Patch third-party software with available updates

4.37

Perform automated / scheduled anti-virus scans

4.03

Disconnect unused network connections

3.79

Perform regular data backups

3.67

Check for unknown file shares

3.59

Check for unknown user accounts

3.50

Perform automated / scheduled anti-malware scans

3.46

Check and confirm the integrity of data backups

3.34

Remove unused programs

3.26

Regularly defragment the hard drive

3.17

Perform manual anti-malware scans

3.00

Free up wasted space (e.g., Disk Cleanup)

2.94

Perform manual anti-virus scans

2.83

Regularly run hard drive repair utilities (e.g., chkdsk)

2.66

Clear cache, cookies, and browser history and temporary Internet files

2.59

Audit available anti-virus logs

2.58

Audit available operating system logs

2.39

Audit available anti-malware logs

2.38

Audit available firewall logs

2.27
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Utilize third-party registry maintenance tools (e.g., Registry Mechanic)

2.11
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APPENDIX C: Interview Questions
1. What are the goals for the task force?
2. What do you think the task force produced?
3. Why do you think that USU needs the computer
security standards?
4. To what end do you think the task force can:
A. Achieve the common task?
B. Work as a team?
C. Meet individual (department) needs?
5. How do you think the task force used the following
ideas?
Effective groups? evaluated the validity of
opinions
Effective groups? analyzed possible solutions
thoroughly
Based their decisions on reasonable premises
Leaders encouraged constructive arguments
6. Did the final conclusions match your expectations?
7. Did you agree with the final conclusions?
8. Where were the final conclusions lacking?
A.

Where was their strength?

9. Is there anything you would change about the group
or its interpretation of the needs of the
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university?
10. How do you think that the university will change
because of these recommendations?
11. How do you think the university will implement
these recommendations?
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APPENDIX D: Biography of Subjects
These subjects came from a variety of backgrounds: one
was a musician in the military for 20 years; one was an
electrical engineer who started fiddling with computers in
his later life; another was a traditional computer science
major who always knew that working in computing
environments was what he wanted to do.
Subject A was the CIO of the organization. His
executive responsibilities included providing strategic
information systems direction to the institution, as well
as focusing the efforts of approximately 90 full time
employees and a multimillion-dollar budget in support of
the University’s mission. He held a doctoral degree in
Education, specializing in Management Information Systems,
a Business masters degree, and a Bachelors degree in
Computer Engineering. His focus over the past three years
was a strategic and comprehensive restructuring of all
information systems, services, and policies, focusing on
benefit to the overall institution. This effort created a
successful unified approach to a broad range of information
systems and services. In addition to his executive roles,
he enjoyed teaching strategic IS management, technology, ecommerce, and financial topics, presenting by invitation
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nationally, as well as teaching at USU and the University
of Phoenix. His approach to management was to simply have
his employees call him by his first name. He describes
himself as “an average father of five, who just happens to
be able to explain a lot of acronyms. People enjoy [his]
humor and ability to share useful information with everyone,
especially non-techies!”
Subject B was formerly the director of information
technology marketing and was promoted to director of
special projects. He was previously responsible for the
marketing, communication and training with Information
Technology at Utah State University. In this role, he
coordinated the Network Managers meetings, encompassing all
the IT Professionals at the University. He held a Bachelors
degree in Computer Science and a Masters in Instructional
Technology. Since 2001, he was the Senior Instructional
Designer at the Faculty Assistance Center for Teaching, a
technology center for faculty. He enjoyed working with
faculty to help them integrate technology into their
teaching.
As director of special projects, Subject B was chair
of the committee to search for new technology solutions to
ongoing organizational problems. His project was the
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development of a campus-wide voice over IP system.
Subject C was the head of university information
technology security. He started one of the first full-time
dedicated information technology security teams in the
state. He fondly recalled childhood memories of riding a
tricycle back and forth on the USU campus. He wanted to
stay at USU for as long as he could remember, and as a
result, most of his reward was simply participating at USU.
To quote: “I pestered the people who were IT years and
years ago, checked on them every month asking if they had a
job or so. Every week or two for several months until they
finally offered me an entry-level job, and that was almost
thirty years ago. So I’ve been doing IT ever since.”
Back in the days when Subject C got that first job,
computers were still using punch cards. He started at the
mainframes, helped run the early forms of the USU help desk,
and helped manage the earliest computer labs, CPM machines,
MS-DOS machines, and Windows machines. At the time of his
interview he used Linux as his primary operating system. At
one time, he was involved in telecommunications. That was
where he finally learned the basics of the scientific
method--how to test things and how to do diagnostics and
debugging. That revelation strongly affected his career,
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leading him into more complicated environments and the
management of more complicated systems at USU. He stated:
“So I’m not here, for the most part, not because they pay
me, or because that’s where I could get work. I’m here
because this is where I wanted to be.”
Subject D was with the organization for over 20 years.
He graduated from USU with a Bachelor in Computer Science.
He loved computer science so much that he stayed with the
department and formed one of the first college-specific IT
departments. At the time of his interview, he managed a lab
with over 150 computers. Of those 150, the majority used
the Microsoft Windows operating system, four were Apple Mac
OS X based Mackintoshes, and eight used different
distributions of Linux. He also managed all the computers
for the computer science department.
As part of his duties, Subject D also oversaw student
lab managers. They helped him run the day-to-day operations
of his computer lab. He stated that they are responsible
for maintaining a sense of presence to help keep the users
of the lab mindful of their actions. He described his
faculty as “knowledgeable,” and because there are concerned
experts in the field, they maintained their own systems.
His hobbies included amateur radio and telecommunications.
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Subject E managed the labs in the College of
Humanities. He was with the college for five years. His
training happened mainly on the job, starting when he was a
student intern with the research laboratory performing
desktop support for the scientists. His current
responsibilities included managing two major computer labs
in the English Department consisting of 48 computers and
one major lab in the Journalism department consisting of 20
computers. He also managed various small labs for other
departments, each with 2 to 5 computers. His labs were
split 90 percent Microsoft Windows to 10 percent Apple OS X,
with no installations of Linux. Subject E oversaw two
student interns that not only helped out in his lab but
also covered some basic desktop support for the employees
of the college. He was still working on his undergraduate
degree and continued to dabble in computer gaming.
Subject F came into computers through a very different
path. After completing 18 years in the Marines as a
musician, he realized that he would need a new skill set
for civilian life. He used the G.I. Bill to formally train
as a musician and found himself attending the Open Source
and Free Software Club at Utah State University. He stated
that he always had an attraction to technology, which
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started in the military and grew once he came to college.
He added computer science as a major and graduated with
degrees in both music and computer science. The focus of
his undergraduate studies was open source software.
During his undergraduate studies, Subject F was hired
by the College of Education as a second to the primary
technology specialist. He quickly became the go-to guy in
the college for Unix-based operating systems. His use of
Unix-based operating systems led him to become the server
and lab manager for the Instructional Technology department.
Subject F’s computer lab consisted of 30 Apple Macintosh
computers. He stated, “Education has always been
predominantly Mac; it seemed only natural to provide a Macbased solution for our education environment.”

While the

primary use of these computers was to run Mac OS X
applications, he also configured them to dual boot with
Microsoft Windows. However, the Windows side was not
directly connected to the servers. Subject F was the only
support for his lab, and he used Apple-based security tools
to help him manage it. He recently was married and was
expecting a new child in May 2012.
The final subject, Subject G, was the manager for all
the open access labs on the Logan campus. His 369 computers
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were spread across 7 computer labs with another 20
computers coming on-line in the upcoming year. Most of the
computers were Windows-based PCs, while 60 of the lab
computers were Apple Macintosh computers.
Subject G was also the Manager of Information
Technology Services for Utah State University. He graduated
from Utah State University with a degree in Administrative
Systems and Business Administration with an emphasis in
Computer Science. For the past 24 years, Subject G managed,
maintained, and provided technical and customer services to
students, faculty, and staff at Utah State University.
As a part of his position, Subject G maintained the
responsibility of managing and maintaining seven openaccess computer labs, in which he hired and managed 85
student workers. Subject G continued to dedicate his time
in assisting Utah State University students, in pursuit of
their academic goals, by providing state-of-the-art
computing technology, software, and hands on experiences.

158

Robert F. Houghton
838 Hillcrest Ave
Logan, Utah 84321
(435) 363-7451
E-mail: bob.houghton@gmail.com

OBJECTIVE
To obtain a position where I can use my expertise to support all facets of computer networks,
domains, and workstations.

WORK EXPERIENCE
Utah State University, Vice President for Information Technology
February 2011 – Present
Network Security Specialists
● Created and implemented system of NetFlow data generators and collectors
using open-source tools across the entire USU Network
● Created and implemented internal PCI audit procedures including virtual and
physical penetration testing.
● Created and implemented an Intrusion Detection System using Snort
● Created custom Snort rules for USU sensitive systems
● Implemented upgrade to Nessus scanner and created new scan policies
● Installed and configured custom border firewall rules
Utah State University, Caine College of the Arts
July 2010 – January 2011
Systems Administrator
● Led division of IT resources between the College of Humanities and Social
Sciences and the Caine College of the Arts
● Created College IT five-year plan using limited budget resources, including
outsourcing most IT needs from the college to the central IT teams
Utah State University, College of Humanities, Arts and Social Sciences
January 2006 – June 2010
Associate Systems Administrator
● Composed university wide security policies
● Co-chaired university committee to standardize policies across colleges
● Installed, configured, and administered System Center Configuration Manager in
a trusted multi-domain environment
● Installed, configured, and administered Apple Remote Desktop and Task Server
across Windows 2003 Active Directory Domain
● Analyzed, documented and tracked security events across the College
● Configured and deployed new VMWare-based solutions for our server needs
● Integrated Mac OS X and Linux into a Windows 2003 Domain Environment
● Created and maintained Group Policies for Windows 2003 Active Directory
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Utah State University Research Foundation, North Logan, UT
July 2003 – December 2005
IT Support
● Provided fast and reliable desktop support
● Installed and configured workstations
● Troubleshot network problems
● Advised and performed workstation upgrades
Computer Solutions, Santa Rosa, CA
May 1999 – January 2002
Head Technician
● Built custom computers for clients
● Provided support for client computers and networks
● Installed and maintained various database programs for clients
● Built and installed Microsoft NT 4.0 and 2000 networks and servers
● Advised and performed network upgrades
● Maintained Novell 5.0 server

CERTIFICATION
2012. International Information Systems Security Certification Consortium, Palm Harbor, FL.
Systems Security Certified Practioner (SSCP)
2005. Microsoft Corporation, Redmond, Washington
MCSE:S certification on Windows Server 2003

EDUCATION
2013. Utah State University, Logan Utah
Doctor of Philosophy in Management Information Systems
2008. Utah State University, Logan, Utah
Masters of Science in Management Information Systems
2006. Utah State University, Logan, Utah
Bachelors of Music in Music, Cum Laude
2001. Santa Rosa Junior College, Santa Rosa, California
Graduate, Associates of Arts with Honors

